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The Utah State Tax Commission (hereinafter "Tax Commission" or 
~ "Commission") hereby files this Amicus Brief in the above captioned matter to explain 
when and how the Tax Commission exercises its jurisdiction to value mineral reserves so 
that this Court's decision will not inadvertently impact the Commission's current 
assessment and valuation practice. 
BACKGROUND 
This appeal involves a dispute over who is entitled to receive royalties on the 
production of oil and gas from a well drilled in 2012 in Uintah County. The Appellants 
contend that they own the rights to the mineral estate because they acquired the subject 
property in a tax sale. One of the underlying factual considerations is under what 
circumstances does the Tax Commission exercise its jurisdiction to value and assess 
mineral reserves. 
The Tax Commission believes it is important for this Court to understand why the 
Commission has not and does not value undeveloped mineral reserves separately from 
the surface estate for property tax purposes. The Tax Commission is not aware of how it 
could presently value undeveloped reserves in a manner that meets the uniformity 
requirement of Utah Const. Art. XIII § 2( 1 ). This brief sets forth the consistent historical 
and current treatment of, as well as the legal and policy bases for, the Tax Commission's 
vii current Rules in this area that do not separately value undeveloped mineral reserves in 
Utah. 1 The Tax Commission contends that in accordance with the Constitutional 
1 The Commission has recently become aware of county concerns regarding portions of 
the District Court's ruling on the tax lien date and whether or not county assessments of 
1 
requirements of uniformity and equality, it has not separately valued or assessed property 
taxes on undeveloped mineral reserves in Utah because taxes cannot be imposed on such 
reserves in a uniform manner.2 Under current government staffing and funding, and 
industry standards of classifying mineral and petroleum reserves, accurate consistent 
identification and valuation of undeveloped reserves is not possible. As such, uniformity 
and equality cannot be met and taxes may not be imposed. 
The issue of when the Tax Commission separately values undeveloped mineral 
reserves is important to the Tax Commission. The Tax Commission requests the Court to 
maintain the Tax Commission's current practice by not inserting precedential language 
into its opinion which might have the inadvertent effect of requiring the Tax Commission 
to find and value all such undeveloped reserves for the purpose of applying a property 
tax. The issue of when reserves are quantified with reasonable certainty, have a 
reasonably determinable value, and can be economically extracted, is a complex factually 
driven inquiry. This issue should be first left to the Legislature and the Tax Commission, 
(the latter as the body charged with the power to "assess mines" under Article XIII, 
property include mineral rights. Because those issues directly impact the counties and the 
parties to this appeal, they should address them. This amicus brief focuses on the issue 
relating to the Tax Commission's assessment authority over certain classes of property 
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-201 et seq. ("central assessment" or "centrally assessed 
properties") rather than properties assessed by the counties under 59-1-301 et seq. or tax 
lien and tax sale issues that the counties administer. 
2 The Tax Commission assesses patented mining claims of non-operating mines. It does 
so by using the land values developed by the respective county. Reserves or mineral 
rights may be a part of the property rights associated with the mining claims, but the Tax 
Commission does not separately value them. 
2 
Section 6 of the Utah Constitution), and appropriate tax cases brought before the Utah 
vJ district and appellate courts. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TAX COMMISSION DOES NOT SEPARATELY VALUE 
UNDEVELOPED MINERAL RESERVES. 
As outlined below, the Tax Commission has not historically separately valued 
"undeveloped" petroleum ( oil and gas) reserves or mineral reserves that are not "proven 
and probable," or, in the case of a productive mine, the reserves are not otherwise 
valuable to a reasonably quantifiable level. Throughout this brief, unless otherwise 
noted, the term "undeveloped reserves" shall include both (1) undeveloped reserves in an 
oil or gas field, and (2) non-oil and gas minerals that are not classified for SEC purposes 
as proven or probable reserves. 3 
The Tax Commission urges the Court to avoid issuing a ruling which would 
change this practice. In order to better understand the Tax Commission's practices, a 
brief introduction to terms related to mineral reserves is first warranted followed by a 
brief foundation regarding the Tax Commission's authority to assess mineral rights. 
A. Defining Types of Reserves. 
Oil, gas and other mineral reserves are classified into various categories by the 
United States Securities and Exchange Commission and by industry standards so that 
companies uniformly report the reserves on their books. See e.g., 17 C.F.R. 210.4 
3The use of the reserve classification terms, such as "undeveloped reserves" are not 
determinative of taxation in isolation. When considering the assessment of mines and wells, the 
Tax Commission looks at the totality of information surrounding the resource. For example, a 
property owner may for some purposes classify a reserve as "undeveloped," but other evidence 
may indicate the reserve is "developed" under SEC and industry classifications. 
3 
(2015); Guidelines for Application of the Petroleum Resources Management System 4 for 
oil and gas reserves;5 17 C.F .R. 229.801 (g) (2015), Industry Guide 7 and the SME Guide 
for Reporting Exploration Results, Mineral Resources and Mineral Reserves for other 
mineral reserves. As outlined below, these SEC and industry definitions have been used 
in Utah to define what is and is not subject to property tax. 
For oil and gas, "developed reserves" are, in general, those "that can be expected 
to be recovered ... [t]hrough existing wells." 17 C.F.R. 210.4-10(a)(6) (2015). In 
contrast, "undeveloped reserves" are, in general, those "that are expected to be recovered 
from new wells on undrilled acreage." 17 C.F.R. 210.4-10(a)(31) (emphasis added). 
Similarly, Utah Admin. Code R884-24P-10 (2015) only values "productive underground 
oil and gas rights" rather than those that are not drilled as discussed in more detail below. 
For non-oil and gas minerals (such as copper or coal), a "Reserve" is "[t]hat part 
of a mineral deposit which could be economically and legally extracted or produced at 
the time of the reserve determination." 17 C.F .R. 229.801 (g) (2015) and Industry Guide 
7(a)(l). However, only proven or probable reserves are sufficiently known, identified, 
and capable of economic extraction to allow SEC reporting. Id. and Industry Guide 
7(b)(5). "Proven (measured) reserves" are "[r]eserves for which (a) quantity is computed 
from dimensions revealed in outcrops, trenches, workings or drill holes; grade and/or 
4See,http://www.smenet.org/docs/publications/2014 SME Guide Reporting %20June 1 
0 2014.pdf (last visited November 12, 2015) Also see the Joint Ore Reserves Committee 
(JORC) guidelines. 
5 See, https://secure.spee.org/reserves-definitions-committee-rdc (last visited November 
12, 2015). 
4 
quality are computed from the results of detailed sampling and (b) the sites for 
~ inspection, sampling and measurement are spaced so closely and the geologic character is 
s·o well defined that size, shape, depth and mineral content of reserves are well 
established." Id. and Industry Guide 7(a)(2). In contrast, "Probable (Indicated) reserves" 
are "[r]eserves for which quantity and grade and/or quality are computed from 
information similar to that used for proven (measured) reserves, but the sites for 
inspection, sampling, and measurement are farther apart or are otherwise less adequately 
spaced. The degree of assurance, although lower than that for proven (measured) 
reserves, is high enough to assume continuity between points of observation." Id. and 
Industry Guide 7(a)(3). Similarly, Utah's administrative rule only requires valuation for 
proven and probable reserves ( discussed in more detail below). See Utah Admin. Code 
R884-24P-7(B)(2)(2015). 
B. The Tax Commission Values Mineral Reserves of Productive Mining 
Property. 
As stated above, the Tax Commission separately values the mineral reserves of 
productive mining property. Since its creation in 1929 through an amendment to the 
\./;P Utah Constitution, the Tax Commission has had the constitutional and statutory authority 
to assess all mines and mining claims. Utah Const. Art. XIII§ 6 ("The State Tax 
Commission shall: ... (b) assess mines."); Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-201(l)(a)(v) ("all 
mines and mining claims" are to be centrally assessed by the Commission). A "mine" is 
statutorily defined as "a natural deposit of either metalliferous or non-metalliferous 
valuable mineral," and "non-metalliferous minerals' includes ... oil [and] gas." Utah 
5 
Code Ann. § 59-2-102(24), (27) (emphasis added). Accordingly, it is the Tax 
Commission that is responsible to find and assess any taxable reserves of productive 
mining property so that a tax may be applied to the market value; i.e., those with value. 
A related issue, on which the Commission will not opine and which it believes can 
be adequately addressed by the other parties to this litigation and the Utah counties 
(should they wish to be heard), is whether mineral rights are part of the bundle of 
property rights included in the counties' assessment and valuation of properties.6 In other 
words, are mineral rights with no value or a de minimus value included or impounded in 
assessments where they are not separately valued? 
C. The Tax Commission's Administrative Record and Decisions Show 
That It Historically Has Not and Currently Does Not Separately Value 
Undeveloped Reserves for Property Tax Purposes. 
The Tax Commission's administrative record on the issue of not separately 
valuing undeveloped reserves is substantial. The record shows that the Tax Commission 
does not presently separately value, and has not historically separately valued, property 
tax on undeveloped reserves. ( Oil and gas reserves and other mineral reserves are treated 
under different rules and are separately discussed herein.) 
Rule R884-24P-10 (2015) ("Rule 10") is the rule used by the Commission to 
separately value and assess oil and gas reserves. In 1991, the Commission held public 
hearings in connection with a proposed amendment to its Rule 10 wherein the 
6 This issue also applies to the Tax Commission's valuation of non-productive patented 
mining claims. However, the counties, through their treasurers and auditors, levy and 
collect the property tax on Tax Commission assessments as well as their own assessments 
and so are the parties potentially impacted by a decision on this issue. 
6 
Commission proposed using a "discounted cash flow" (DCF) method to value oil and gas 
properties. See Tax Commission Summary Judgment Order in Appeal No. 03-093 7 
(Nov. 16, 2004), at p. 26-34 (attached hereto as Exhibit A). On November 13, 1991, 
Uintah, Summit, Duchesne, Grand, and San Juan Counties, their constituent school 
districts, and the Utah State Office of Education submitted comments (attached hereto as 
Exhibit B) requesting that the rule amendment include "valuation of undrilled leases and 
undeveloped reserves." At a public hearing on December 19, 1991, arguments were made 
that "the DCF method did not capture the effect of undeveloped leases." See Tax 
Commission Appeal No. 03-0937, at 31. 
In early February, 1992, "[t]he Commission received letters from the [same] 
taxing entities that had opposed the Rule 10 amendments, whereby they informed the 
Commission that they were withdrawing their objections to the proposed amendments to 
Rule 1 0" as part of a settlement of earlier contested tax appeals. Id., at 32. Further, they 
i.iP "agreed that the DCF valuation model, as proposed by the Division, should be used to 
value oil and gas companies for the [ current] tax year." Id. 
The application of this rule to undeveloped reserves was then tested in 2003. 
~ 
Uintah County appealed the assessed value of a taxpayer, and argued that undeveloped 
reserves of that taxpayer should be valued and taxed. In its decision in that case, the Tax 
~ Commission, while expressly reserving the question of whether undeveloped reserves are 
subject to property tax, stated that "[u]nder Rule 10, historically and including the 2003 
tax year, the valuation model used to determine the fair market value of property owned 
by a centrally assessed oil and gas company, for assessment and taxation purposes, has 
7 
measured the impact of value attributable to its developed oil and gas reserves, but has 
not measured the impact of value attributable to its undeveloped oil and gas reserves .... 
The Rule 10 administrative record clearly indicates that the Commission was aware, 
when it adopted the amendment in 1992, that this DCF model was not intended to 
measure the impact of undeveloped oil and gas reserves." See Tax Commission Decision 
03-0937, at p. 34. (Attached hereto as Exhibit A.) 
The Commission added that "[a]s the agency given the powers and duties to 
administer and supervise the tax laws of this state, the Commission is aware and also 
takes official notice of the fact that value that might be attributable to undeveloped 
reserves has not been specifically accounted for in the appraisal methods used in Utah 
under Rule 10." Id. at 33. Thus the Commission recognizes that sometimes undeveloped 
reserves do have value, such as when they are directly purchased. However, the 
Commission ruled in its decision in case 03-093 7 that undeveloped reserves could not be 
valued and taxed in 2003 because to do so for only one taxpayer without finding and 
valuing undeveloped reserves for all taxpayers would violate the uniformity clause of the 
Utah Constitution. Id. at 44-45. Under this 2004 decision, the Tax Commission has 
continued to assess oil and gas properties under Rule 10, and has not valued undeveloped 
reserves. 
Importantly, the Tax Commission is unaware of any evidence or information in its 
administrative record suggesting that undeveloped reserves in oil or gas fields have ever 
been valued or taxed since statehood in 1896, even before the adoption of Rule 10 in 
1992. 
8 
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'-IV 
Minerals other than oil and gas are valued and assessed by the Tax Commission 
,,.a pursuant to Rule R884-24P-7 (2015) ("Rule 7"). The Tax Commission promulgated Rule 
7 in its current form in 1998, specifying that minerals need to be reported to the Tax 
Commission only when they are part of a mine plan for "proven and probable reserves." 
Id at (B)(2). 
II. THE TAX COMMISSION DOES NOT SEPARATELY VALUE 
UNDEVELOPED MINERAL RESERVES FOR PROPERTY TAX 
PURPOSES BECAUSE IT CANNOT DO SO UNIFORMLY AS REQUIRED 
BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The Utah Constitution requires that assessment of property occur "at a uniform 
and equal rate in proportion to its fair market value." Utah Const. art. XIII, § 2(1)(a) 
( emphasis added). "(T]he law has long been that where 'it is impossible to achieve both 
the standards of the true value, and the uniformity and equality required by law, the latter 
requirement is to be preferred as the just and ultimate purpose of the law."' Rio Algom v. 
Rio Algom v. San Juan County, 681 P .2d 184, 194 (Utah 1984) ( quoting Sioux City 
Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441 (1923)). 
Additionally, Utah Code section 59-2-201(1)(a)(v) requires the Tax Commission 
~ to assess all "mines," then section 59-2-102(24) defines "mine" to mean "a natural 
deposit of either metalliferous or nonmetalliferous valuable mineral." ( emphasis added). 
Thus, both the Constitution and statutes require the Tax Commission to impose tax 
uniformly on all minerals with value. The Tax Commission has determined that the best 
way to separately value and tax minerals in a uniform manner is to (1) value and tax oil 
and gas after a well is drilled and the minerals become "developed reserves" (see Tax 
9 
Commission Appeal No. 03-0937), (if oil and gas have sufficient value, someone will 
presumably drill a well to tap into such value), and (2) value other minerals when they 
have become "proven reserves" or "probable reserves" (see Rule 7(B)(2)), which by 
definition means the reserves are "economic," see 17 CPR 229.801 (g) (2015) and 
Industry Guide 7(a)(l). 
Given the Constitutional and statutory requirements to uniformly assess and 
impose tax, there is no currently feasible means for the Tax Commission to uniformly 
find and separately value all undeveloped reserves in Utah. Thus the Tax Commission 
does not separately value them. 7 The map attached hereto as Exhibit C shows the vast 
reserves that the Utah Geologic Survey estimates are beneath our state. The map indicates 
that there is undeveloped coal underneath significant parts of Utah, along with various 
other undeveloped minerals throughout the state. The reserves are hidden, undiscovered, 
and of indeterminate value. To try to separately value all undeveloped reserves apart from 
the real property on a uniform basis is impractical because that would require finding and 
uniformly valuing all of the copper, oil, gas, salt, etc. under the land of every farmer, 
rancher, and other landowner in Utah. This is simply not feasible for either petroleum or 
minerals reserves for the following reasons. Petroleum reserves must be developed in 
order to determine the production and decline rates that underlie the projection of income 
streams necessary for financial valuation analysis. Mineral reserves must be proven or 
7 The Tax Commission disagrees with the District Court's characterization of 
undeveloped reserves as "akin to an intangible asset" "not subject to taxation." See 
Ruling and Order at p. 10, attached hereto as Exhibit D. Mineral reserves are clearly 
tangible. The Tax Commission does not value them because it cannot do so uniformly, 
not because they are intangible. 
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probable or, if part of a productive mine, otherwise valuable in a reasonably quantifiable 
manner in order to undertake financial valuation analys is. 
At a preliminary stage of evaluation, similar properties may appear to contain 
s imilar reserves, but one may never sta1t production because of issues discovered as it 
moves towards the development stage. It is simply not feasible for the Tax Commission 
to try to uniformly find and separately value all undeveloped reserves consistent with the 
requirements of the Utah Constitution and statutes. The Tax Commission must wait until 
the property owners establish the value with greater certainty as they put it into 
production before it separately values them. It is possible that the industry practices and 
technology will change in the future to allow different reliable criteria to be employed to 
determine when reserves can by uniformly taxed, but in the past and presently, the 
valuation practices described in this brief has been used. 
Under current natural resource industry practices, reporting and Tax Commission 
staffing, it is not possible for the Tax Commission to separately value undeveloped 
reserves for property taxation purposes in a uniform manner. 
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ADDENDA 
EXHIBIT A 
.. , 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
RECEIVED 
NOV 1 ·s 2004 
Holme, Roberts 
--------------------------- -.fb.-AuJ,en,LLP 
Redacted 
Petitioner, 
Redacted 
Petitioner, 
v. 
PROPERTY TAX DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
) 
) 
) ORDER DENYING RESPONDENT'S MOTION 
) TO STRIKE AND/OR DISMISS AND 
) GRANTING RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
) PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) 
) 
) Appeal Nos. 03-0937 and 03-0963 
) 
) Tax Type: Centrally Assessed / Property Tax 
) 
) Tax Year: 2003 
) 
) 
Presiding: Pam Hendrickson, Commission Chair 
R. Bruce Johnson, Commissioner 
Appearances: 
Kerry R. Chapman, Administrative Law Judge 
Redacted 
For Redacted 
Redacted 
Redacted 
Redacted 
Redacted 
Redacted 
For Respondent: Redacted 
Redacted 
, Attorney at Law 
Attorney at Law 
Redacted 
, Attorney at Law 
Attorney at Law 
Assistant Attorney General 
Property Tax Division 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This matter is before the Commission on Respondent's Motion to Strike .and/or 
Dismiss or Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed by Property Tax Division ("Division") on 
February 4, 2004 and on its Errata to Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss or Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, filed on February 5, 2004 ( collectively referred to as Division' s "Motion"). On March l 0, 
2004, Redacted ") filed a Memorandum in Support of the 
DEPO000776 
Appeal Nos. 03-0937 and 03-0963 
Division's Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss or Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Redacted 
"Support of Motion") and Redacted filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Property Tax 
Division's Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss or Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Redact 
ed 
"Opposition to Motion"). Other filings related to the Division's Motion included the 
Respondent's Reply Regarding its Motion to Strike and/or Dismiss or Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment (Division's "Reply Regarding Motion"), filed by the Division on March 30, 2004; Redact 
ed 
Memorandum in Opposition to Redacted Resources' Memorandum Supporting Motion to 
Strike and/or Dismiss or Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Redacted "Opposition to 
Supporting Motion") and the Affidavit of Eckhardt Arthur Prawitt, both filed by Redacted on 
March 31, 2004; and Redacted Reply Memorandum in Support of the Division's Motion to Strike 
and/or Dismiss or Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Redacted "Reply Supporting Motion"), 
also filed on March 31, 2004. A Hearing on the Respondent's Motion was held on April 14, 2004. 
Two appeals have been filed in this matter, both brought before the Com.mission 
to contest the value at which the Division assessed oil and gas property owned by Redacted for 
the 2003 tax year. Redacted (Appeal No. 03-0937) contends in its Objection and Petition 
for Redetermination ("Petition") that the fair market value of Redacted centrally assessed 
property is higher than the Division's assessed value, while Redacted (Appeal No. 03-0963) 
contends that the Division assessed the value too high. Although Redacted Petition lists a 
number of reasons why the Division failed to assess the fair market value of all taxable tangible 
property owned by Redacted inherent in its appeal (as later discussed) is the implication that the 
-2-
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Appeal Nos. 03-0937 and 03-0963 
Division did not properly attribute value to Redacted oil and gas reserves not in development or 
for which a plan of production did not exist (hereinafter referred to as "undeveloped reserves") as 
of the January 1, 2003 lien date. In defense or objection to this position, the Division filed the 
Motion at issue. 
In its Motion, the Division argues that, in its appraisals, it never attempted to 
incorporate a method or technique that specifically measures the effect of undeveloped reserves 
of an oil and gas company when determining, for assessment measures, the fair market value of 
its taxable tangible property. Furthermore, the Division argues that should it be required to do 
so, administrative and equalization issues would arise for which it knows no solution. For these 
reasons, the Division asks the Commission to uphold its current practice and to rule that Utah 
law permits it to assess a centrally assessed oil and gas company without employing an appraisal 
method that measures the impact of the assessed property's undeveloped reserves. The Division 
Motion requests that the ruling be issued in an Order to Strike, an Order to Dismiss, or an Order 
for Partial Summary Judgment. Redacted supports the Division's request for the Commission to 
address this issue prior to an evidentiary hearing on Redacted assessed value. 
Redacted contends the Commission may not grant any portion of the 
Division's Motion because it failed to set forth adequate legal and factual grounds for such relief 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("URCP"). In addition, Redacted contends that an 
evidentiary hearing is necessary to determine material facts at issue and that the Commission 
must deny the Division's Motion in order to afford the county its right to due process oflaw. 
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APPLICABLE LAW 
There are a number oflegal authorities discussed in this Order, which are segregated 
into two categories for easier reference. Authorities relating to motions, administrative law and other 
procedural issues are listed under "Motions and Administrative Law," while authorities relating to 
the taxation of oil and gas property are listed under "Taxation of Property". 
I. MOTIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. 
A. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In defense of a claim, Rule 12(b) of the URCP 
("Rule l 2(b )") provides that a party may request by motion an Order of Dismissal for: 
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over 
the person, (3) improper venue, ( 4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency 
of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party. If, on a motion asserting the 
defense numbered ( 6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented 
to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties 
shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56. 
Rule 12(f) of the URCP ("Rule 12(f)") provides that, upon receiving a motion to 
strike, a "court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, 
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." 
Rule 56 of the URCP ("Rule 56") provides that a party defending a claim may file a 
motion for summary judgment in whole or part and that summary judgment may be rendered, as 
follows: 
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(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted ... may, at any time, move with or without supporting 
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof. 
( c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment 
sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and ad.missions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law .... 
( d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy ... and directing such further proceedings in the action as are 
just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
Rule 7 of the URCP ("Rule 7") addresses pleadings, motions, and orders associated 
with a civil trial. Prior to November 1, 2003, Rule 7(b)(l) provided that "an application to the court 
for an order shall be by motion which ... shall be made in writing, shall state with particularity the 
grounds therefore, and shall set forth the relief or order sought." Effective November I, 2003, 
however, Rule 7 was amended and now contains specific requirements concerning a motion for 
summary judgment, as follows: 
(b) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion 
which ... shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in 
writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the 
grounds for the relief sought. 
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( c) Memoranda. 
( c )(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except 
uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting 
memorandum .... 
(c)(3) Content. 
( c )(3)(A) A memorandwn supporting a motion for swnmary judgment shall· 
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends 
no genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered 
and supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed 
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the 
responding party. 
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in 
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the 
opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, 
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery 
materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, 
each fact shall be s~parately stated and numbered and supported by citation to 
supporting materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. 
B. Utah Code Annotated. UCA §63-46a-12 of the Utah AdministrativeRulemaking 
Act provides that an interested party may petition an agency to make, amend, or repeal an 
administrative rule and that "the agency shall either deny the petition in a writing stating its reasons 
for the denial, or initiate rulemaking proceedings in accordance with Section 63-46a-4." 
All state agency actions, except as specified, are governed by the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act ("UAP A"), as found in Sections 63-46b-l through-23 of the Utah Code Annotated. 
UCA §63-46b-1 provides as follows: 
(4) This chapter does not preclude an agency, prior to the beginning of an 
adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding officer during an adjudicative 
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proceeding from: ... (b) granting a timely motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment if the requirements of Rule 12(b) or Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure are met by the moving party, except to the extent that the 
requirements of those rules are modified by this chapter. 
( 6) This chapter does not preclude an agency from enacting a rule affecting 
or governing an adjudicative proceeding or from following the rule, if the rule 
is enacted according to the procedures outlined in Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, and if the rule conforms to the requirements 
of this chapter. 
An administrative agency may take "official notice" of certain facts not otherwise 
in the record as set forth in Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-8{l)(b), which provides that: 
"[o]n his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer 
... (iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially 
noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other 
proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts within 
the agency's specialized knowledge." 
C. Utah Administrative Rules. The Tax Commission has enacted rules addressing 
the content and format of requests for administrative action and motions. Utah Admin. Rule R861-
l A-22 establishes the requirements for a petition to commence adjudicative proceedings before the 
Commission, as follows: 
B. Contents. A petition for adjudicative action need not be in any particular form, 
but shall be in writing and, in addition to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 63-46b-3, shall contain the following: 
4. particular tax or issue involved, period of alleged liability, amount of tax in 
dispute, and, in the case of a property tax issue, the lien date; 
... ; and 
6. in the case of property tax cases, the assessed value sought. 
C. Effect ofNonconfonnance. The commission will not reject a petition because of 
nonconfonnance in form or content, but may require an amended or substitute 
petition meeting the requirements of this section when such defects are present. An 
-7-
... DEPO000782 
Appeal Nos. 03-0937 and 03-0963 
amended or substitute petition must be filed within 15 days after notice of the defect 
from the commission. 
Utah Admin. Rule R861-1A-26, which establishes procedures for fonnal adjudicative 
proceedings before the Commission, specifically addresses motions in Section (F), as follows: 
4. Ruling on Procedural Motions. Procedural motions may be made during the 
hearing or by written motion. 
a) Each motion shall include the grounds upon which it is based and the relief or 
order sought. Copies of written motions shall be served upon all other parties to the 
proceeding. 
b) Upon the filing of any motion, the presiding officer may: 
( 1) grant or deny the motion; or 
(2) set the matter for briefing, hearing, or further proceedings. 
D. Utah Rules ofEvidence. Rule 201(b) of the Utah Rules ofEvidence ("URE") 
provides that a ''judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is 
either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of 
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned." 
II. TAXATION OF PROPERTY. 
A. The Utah State Constitution provides for the taxation of tangible property in 
the state. Specifically, Utah Const. art. XIIl, §2(1) provides as follows: 
... all tangible property in the State that is not exempt under the laws of the 
United States or under this Constitution shall be (a) assessed at a unifonn and 
equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law; and 
(b) taxed at a uniform and equal rate. 
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Furthermore, Utah Const. art. XIII, §3 provides the authority to exempt certain tangible property 
from property tax in Utah. This section, however, contains no provision that specifically exempts 
any type of oil and gas reserves from taxation. 
B. Utah Code Annotated. Pursuant to the Constitutional requirement to tax 
tangible property at its fair market value, the Legislature enacted Utah Code Ann. §59-2-103, which 
provides as follows: 
(1) All tangible taxable property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform 
and equal rate on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January 1, 
unless otherwise provided by law. 
The assessment of oil and gas properties is governed by Utah Code Ann. §59-2-201. 
Subsection 59-2-20l{l}(e) provides that the Tax Commission shall assess at 100% of fair market 
value "all mines and mining claims except in cases, as determined by the commission, where the 
mining claims are used for other than mining purposes .... " Furthermore, Subsection 59-2-201(3) 
provides that: 
The method for determining the fair market value of productive mining 
property is the capitalized net revenue method or any other valuation method 
the commission believes, or the taxpayer demonstrates to the commission's 
satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative of the fair market value of the 
mining property .... 
C. Utah Administrative Code. The Utah State Tax Commission ("USTC") 
adopted Utah Admin. Rule R884-24P-10 ("Rule 1 0") to help administer the assessment and taxation 
of oil and gas properties for purposes ofUCA §59-2-201. Section (C) of Rule 10 provides that: 
2. The taxable value of underground oil and gas rights shall be determined by 
discounting future net revenues to their present value as of the lien date of the 
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assessment year and then subtracting the value of applicable exempt federal, 
state, and Indian royalty interests. 
3. The reasonable taxable value of productive underground oil and gas rights 
shall be determined by the methods described in C.2. of this rule or such 
other valuation method that the Tax Commission believes to be reasonably 
determinative of the property's fair market value. 
ANALYSIS 
In its Petition, Redacted claims that the Division improperly assessed 
Redacted centrally assessed oil and gas properties for the 2003 tax year and asserts that the 
assessed value should be $R~d million, a value much higher than the $~ed,a million value at 
which the Division assessed Redacted for 2003 (as reported by the Division in its Errata to 
Motion1) . Redacted states in its Support of Motion that, in a 2002 transaction, it paid $R~d 
million for oil and gas rights that included rights in Redacted 
·. Although the sales price 
represented the purchase of oil and gas reserves in development or for which a plan of production 
existed as of the 2003 lien date (hereinafter referred to as "developed reserves"), both Redacted 
and the Division assert in their respective filings that a portion of the $R~d million sales price 
was attributable to undeveloped oil and gas reserves. 
In its Opposition to Supporting Motion, Redacted includes its Exhibit A, a 
January 30, 2003 letter from Redacted . to Redacted Resources Corporation2 
1 Both Redacted a nd Redacted r epor t Redacted 2003 a sses s ed v a l ue to 
be appr oxi mat e l y $Re million, $R million les s t h a n the Division ' s r e ported 
va l ue . Redacted e xp l a ins in i ts Suppor t of Motion that t he di s crepa ncy is d ue 
to wells own ed by Redacted , but ope rat e d b y a nd assessed t o other entities . 
2 Redacted is a c omp a ny rel ated to t he Petitio ne r 
Redacted Redacted f i l e d memoranda under both names 
in these proc eedings , but ha s clarified that the l a tter company is one t hat 
should be considered t h e Pet itioner. 
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(''Redacted letter") that lends support to Redacted and the Division's assertions that a portion 
of the $Red million sales price was attributable to undeveloped reserves. Specifically, the Redac 
. ~d 
letter refers to its review of Redacted $~ed,a million estimate of net proved reserves 
attributable to its leasehold and royalty interests in Redacted as of December 31, 2002. The 
Redacted letter indicates that the $~ed,a million of "total proved reserves" has been 
apportioned $~ed_a million to "proved developed reserves" and $~ed_a million to "proved 
undeveloped reserves." 
Without an evidentiary hearing, however, the Commission cannot find that any of 
these values is representative of the fair market value of tangible property. Nevertheless, the way 
the parties have used this information in their pleadings and responses indicates to the 
Commission that Redacted has asserted that a value must be ascribed to Redacted 
undeveloped reserves when the Division determines the fair market value of its taxable property 
for assessment purposes. The Commission further sees that Redacted is proposing a 
valuation method or technique that may measure all or a portion of the effect on value of 
undeveloped reserves. Although the assertion was not explicit in Redacted pleadings, the 
Commission determines that it is an inherent part of the county's claim for relief for the 
following reasons. First, Redacted had pleaded that Redacted taxable value is $Red 
million. As Redacted has submitted an exhibit indicating that Redacted developed 
reserves are valued at less than $Red million (Redacted letter), it becomes apparent that Redact 
ed 
is claiming that Redacted assessed value must also include a value ascribed to all or a 
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portion of its undeveloped reserves. 3 In addition, in its Opposition to Supporting Motion, Redact 
ed 
states that "discovery would be needed to quantify exactly the value based on all the 
proved reserves." The Redacted letter, as well as other information before the Commission as 
discussed herein, shows that "proved reserves" includes "proved undeveloped reserves." From 
this information, the Commission concludes that Redacted Petition contains a claim that, 
for assessment purposes, Redacted fair market value for the 2003 tax year must be derived 
using a valuation method that measures the impact of its undeveloped reserves. 
As the Respondent to Redacted 
Motion in defense or in objection of Redacted 
claim for relief, the Division has filed its 
position. In its Motion, the Division 
explains that it has never attempted to use valuation techniques or appraisal methods that 
attribute specific values to undeveloped reserves when assessing an oil and gas company's 
t<1Xable property and requests that its long-standing practice be maintained. For these reasons, 
the Division has requested the Commission to rule whether the Division is required or permitted 
to use appraisal methods that specifically measure the effect of Redacted undeveloped reserves 
on property value for assessment purposes. The Division requests the ruling under any one of 
three separate motions it has filed: 1) a Rule 12(f) motion to strike; 2) a Rule 12(b) motion to 
dismiss, or 3) a Rule 56 motion for partial summary judgment. 
3 Although Redacted originally asser ted in its Petition tha t Redacted 
taxable value was $Re million, i t assert ed in its Oppo s it i on Support ing 
Motion that i ts t a x ab le val ue is fa r g r eat er t han $Re mill ion . In e i t her 
case , the asserted val ue i s greate r than the value of p r oved devel oped 
report ed in t he Redacted letter, as s ubmi tted by Redacted 
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I. MOTION TO STRIKE. Rule l 2(f) of the URCP provides that a "court may 
order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, 
or scandalous matter." Citing this rule, the Division has requested the Commission to strike those 
portions of Redacted Petition that relate to the taxation of undeveloped reserves. However, in 
none of its filings did the Division discuss how Redacted pleadings specifically violate the 
provisions of Rule 12(f). Of the three motions made by the Division, the Rule 12(f) motion to strike 
is the only one Redacted did not offer arguments against, stating that the Division's motion 
failed to identify how its Petition violated this particular rule. In addition, this is the only motion that 
Redacted did not discuss in its response memoranda. 
The Commission, on its own review of Redacted pleadings, does not see 
any redundant, impertinent, or scandalous matter for which an Order to Strike might be 
appropriate. As discussed above, the Commission considers Redacted Petition to contain 
a claim that the value of Redacted undeveloped reserves should be measured and included in its 
assessment for the 2003 tax year. However, when the legality of the claim is still at issue, as it is 
here, the Commission does not consider such a claim to be an insufficient defense or an 
immaterial matter until the legal matter is resolved. For these reasons, the Commission does not 
find a basis to strike any portion ofRedacted 
denies the Division' s motion to strike. 
pleadings under Rule 12(f) and, accordingly, 
II. MOTION TO DISMISS. In its second of three motions, the Division 
requests that the Commission issue an Order of Dismissal under Rule 12(b) of the URCP, which 
lists seven circumstances where it is appropriate to dismiss a claim. However, the Division 
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neither states nor discusses which of the Rule ·12(b) defenses should result in an Order of 
Dismissal. Nevertheless, both Redacted and Redacted found the Division' s motion to be 
sufficiently clear that they each responded to Rule 12(b )(6), which provides for dismissal when a 
petitioner fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted. The Commission has reviewed 
the various defenses available under Rule 12(b) and, given the context of the circumstances and 
the legal ruling requested, also finds that the Division is specifically seeking an Order to Dismiss 
under Rule l2(b)(6). 
In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the 
Commission is required to view Redacted complaint "in the light most favorable to 
[Redacted ] and indulge all reasonable inferences in [its] favor." Mounteer v. Utah Power & 
Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1991). The Commission is also required to "accept the material 
allegations of Redacted .] complaint as true" and only issue an Order of Dismissal "if it 
clearly appears that [Redacted ] can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim." Colman 
v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P .2d 622 (Utah 1990). 
The underlying issue in the Division's Motion is a legal question, specifically 
whether, under Utah law, Redacted fair market value for the 2003 tax year must be based on an 
appraisal method that ascribes a value to its undeveloped oil and gas reserves. If so, Redact 
ed 
may be entitled to relief, assuming its allegations all to be true. As this legal question is 
still in dispute, however, it is not yet known whether relief would be available to Redacted 
even if all its allegations were true. For these reasons, it is premature to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief is available. 
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In addition, the Commission has received and considered information concerning 
this taxation issue that was not part ofRedacted pleadings (see discussion on Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment below). When matters outside the pleadings have been received and 
not excluded, Rule I 2(b) provides that the motion for failure to state a claim for which relief can 
be granted should instead be treated as a motion for summary judgment.4 Because the 
Commission has, in fact, chosen to treat the Division' Motion as a motion for partial summary 
judgment, it may not issue an Order to Dismiss under 12(b)(6). For these reasons, the 
Commission denies the Division' s motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b). 
III. MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. The Division's 
third and last motion is for partial summary judgment. UCA §63-46b-1 ( 4) specifically requires an 
administrative agency to determine if a party moving for summary judgment has met the 
requirements of Rule 56 of the URCP before granting its motion. Rule 56(b) permits a party against 
whom a claim has been asserted to move for summary judgment in its favor. As the Respondent to 
Redacted claims, the Division is a party entitled under Rule 56(b) to "move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in [its] favor as to all or any part thereof." In its 
Motion, the Division has moved for the Commission to issue summary judgment on that part of 
Redacted claim that pertains to the valuation method applicable to undeveloped oil and gas 
reserves. 
4 Se e a l so Thayn e v . Benefi cia l Utah, Inc ., 874 P . 2d 120 (Utah 19 94) , 
wh ich provides that " once matters outside t he plead ings were pres ented to and 
not e xcluded by the trial court , t h e (URCP Rule 1 2(b) (6)] mot'ion was proper ly 
treated as ·one for summary judgment ." 
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"The sole purpose of summary judgment is to bar from the courts unnecessary and 
unjustified litigation." Reliable Furn. Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 16 Utah 2d 211 , 
398 P .2d 685 (1965). An evidentiary hearing is necessary for the Commission to determine the 
value of Redacted taxable oil and gas property. If, however, certain aspects of oil and gas 
property need not be quantified when determining a company's fair market value for assessment 
and taxation purposes, an evidentiary hearing to determine the value of such property would be 
unnecessary. For these reasons, the Division requests that the Commission address in partial 
summary judgment, prior to an evidentiary trial, whether it is legally required to measure the 
effect or impact of undeveloped reserves in its appraisal methods when establishing the fair 
market value of Redacted taxable property. Redacted also supports this motion and expresses a 
desire not to commit the time and expense necessary to appraise and litigate the value of 
undeveloped reserves should such appraisal methods not be legally required. Redacted , on 
the other hand, contends_ that an evidentiary hearing is necessary to prove that a fair market value 
can be established that ascribes value to Redacted undeveloped reserves, in addition to its other 
reserves, and argues that a grant of partial summary judgment on this legal issue would deprive it 
of its right to due process. 
Under Rule 56( d), the Commission is allowed to consider a grant of partial 
summary judgment for a single issue in the case, while reserving the other factual and legal 
issues for a formal evidentiary proceeding. For the Commission to grant the relief sought in the 
Division's motion for partial summary judgment, Rule 56(c) requires it to make two 
determinations: (A) a determination that the legal question posed by the Division is an 
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appropriate matter to address in partial summary judgment (i.e., there exists no genuine issue of a 
material fact needed to answer it); and (B) a determination of the legal question itself, in this 
case, whether the Divi~ion is required to employ an appraisal method that specifically measures 
the effect of undeveloped reserves in setting Redacted assessed value for the 2003 tax year. 
If a material fact needed to answer the legal question is genuinely at issue, then 
the Commission must deny the motion for partial summary judgment and reserve the matter for 
the formal proceeding. If, on the other hand, there is no genuine issue of any material fact, the 
Commission may proceed and answer the legal question now. Of course, a determination that 
the matter is appropriate to address in partial summary judgment only guarantees that the 
Commission will decide the legal question posed. It does not guarantee the Division the relief it 
seeks. 
However, prior to determining whether partial summary judgment is appropriate 
in this matter under the provisions of Rule 56, we should first address Redacted argument 
that the Division's motion for partial summary judgment should be denied because the motion's 
content and format do not meet the requirements ofURCP Rule 7(c)(3)(A). URCP Rule 7(c)(l) 
provides that most motions, including those for summary judgment, be accompanied by a 
supporting memorandum. Rule 7(c)(3)(A) specifically requires a memorandum supporting a 
motion for summary judgment to "contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving 
party contends no genuine issue exists." Furthermore, it requires that "[e]ach fact shall be 
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits 
or discovery materials .... " 
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The Division's motion for partial summary judgment, while describing various 
facts that relate to the legal question at issue, includes neither a statement of separately numbered 
material facts as to which it contends no genuine issue exists nor any materials to support its 
statement of facts. It is clear that the Division's motion does not comply with the content and 
format provisions described in Rule 7( c )(3)(A). In its Opposition to Motion, Redacted 
claims that Rule 7(c)(3)(A) "absolutely mandates" a memorandum supporting summary 
judgment to contain the specific content and be in the specific format prescribed by the rule. The 
Division's noncompliance with Rule 7(c)(3)(A) is one reason, Redacted contends, why the 
Division fails to meet its burden on motion for partial summary judgment and why the 
Commission must deny the motion. 
In the administrative appeals process, the Commission is aware that a uniform set 
of procedural rules promotes efficiency and clarity and provides all parties a known standard for 
preparing and filing documents relating to their appeals. However, the appeals process at an 
administrative agency such as the Tax Commission involves a wide variety of appeal issues, 
from relatively simple ones such as interest refund requests involving several dollars to complex 
issues involving intricate legal theories and millions of dollars of taxes. Not surprisingly, the 
parties that appear before the Commission in the appeals process are also as varied, from the pro 
se petitioner with little or, oftentimes, no knowledge of legal procedures to experienced and 
capable attorneys who regularly represent clients before the Commission and who have intimate 
knowledge of the procedures set forth in the URCP. 
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The Commission encourages, whenever practicable, all parties with administrative 
appeals before this agency to comply with the rules provided in the URCP to better guarantee not 
only the clarity of its pleadings and arguments, but also a general efficiency of process. Such 
clarity and efficiency is particularly important in cases with complex procedural and substantive 
issues, such as the appeals at issue in this matter. On the other hand, the taxpayers of Utah would 
be ill-served were the Commission to deny ordinary citizens who could neither navigate the 
URCP on their own nor afford legal repres~ntation to do so on their behalf the right to address 
their tax matters. Fortunately, the Tax Commission, as an administrative agency, has some 
flexibility when determining whether parties appearing before it must met all requirements set · 
forth in the URCP. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized the flexibility that an administrative 
agency needs when applying the provisions of the URCP. "While the mode of procedure before 
administrative bodies may conform to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing 
civil procedure in the trial courts are not necessarily applicable to administrative proceedings. 
Thus, administrative proceedings are not subject to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure unless the 
governing statute or regulations so provide." Pilcher v. Department of Social Servs., 663 P.2d 
450 (Utah 1983). 
Redacted argues that the Division's motion does not meet the specific 
requirements set forth in Rule 7 of the URCP, one of several rules in the URCP pertaining to the 
content and format of pleadings, motions, and orders submitted to or issued by a court of law. 
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However, while the UAPA and the Commission have both adopted several specific rules in the 
URCP that must be met in all proceedings before the Tax Commission, Rule 7 is not one of 
them. 
Furthermore, many provisions of the UAPA (including UCA §§63-46b-3, 5, 6, 
and 9-13) contain specific content and format requirements for requests for action, pleadings and 
orders that apply in Utah's administrative proceedings. We note· that these requirements are 
unique and, generally, less stringent than those found in the URCP. So too are the specific 
content requirements adopted by the Commission in Utah Admin. Rules R861-1A-22(B) (which 
lists specific content requirements for a petition for adjudicative action before the Commission 
and states that a petition need not be in any particular form) and R861-1A-26(F)( 4)( a) (which 
provides that a motion before the Commission shall include the grounds upon which it is based 
and the relief or order sought). Because an administrative agency has some latitude concerning 
its application of the URCP and because the UAPA and the Commission have not specifically 
adopted Rule 7, the Commission finds that it is not required to deny the Division's motion 
because it failed to meet the requirements of Rule 7. Instead, the Commission finds that the 
Division's motion sufficiently set forth the issue, the grounds upon which it was based, and the 
relief sought and, accordingly, was a motion adequate in content and format for purposes of an 
administrative proceeding before the Commission. 
The Commission recognizes that UCA §63-46b-1(4) specifically requires a 
motion for summary or partial summary judgment to meet the requirements of Rule 56 before it 
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is granted. However, the Commission does not believe that this specific reference to Rule 56 
subjects an administrative proceeding to all the procedural rules found in the URCP that may 
relate to summary judgment, including the specific content and format requirements of Rule 7. 
In addition, we note that Rule 56 make no reference to Rule 7. For these reasons, the 
Commission believes that, if the Division' s motion satisfies the specific requirements of Rule 56, 
Section 63-46b-1(4) has also been satisfied, thereby authorizing it to address the matter in partial 
summary judgment. Accordingly, we proceed to determine whether the motion satisfies Rule 56. 
A. Summary Judgment - Is there a genuine issue of any material fact 
needed to answer the legal question? 
The Division and Redacted both contend that there is no genuine issue of a 
material fact required to answer the legal question in this matter; i.e., whether the valuation for 
Redacted assessment for the 2003 tax year must incorporate a methodology that measures the 
effect of undeveloped reserves. Both of these parties assert that, in compliance with Utah law 
and the Division's historical application of Rule 10, the Division did not ascribe value to any 
undeveloped reserves in Utah for the 2003 tax year, including those owned by Redacted Both 
the Division and Redacted further assert that Redacted Petition, if fully granted, would 
ascribe value to Redacted undeveloped reserves. Redacted contends that, were this to occur, it 
would be the only centrally assessed taxpayer in Utah to be assessed or valued on this b~is, a 
violation of the uniform and equal assessment and taxation provisions of the Utah Constitution. 
The Commission is required to deny the motion if Redacted shows that there 
is a genuine issue of a material fact necessary to answer the legal question. In its Opposition 
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Supporting Motion, Redacted separately stated and numbered additional facts it claims to 
be in dispute and offered, as evidence to support its assertion, an affidavit prepared by Eckhardt 
Arthur Prawitt. In these documents, Redacted claims that evidence will show that the fair 
market value of Redacted total proved reserves (both developed reserves and undeveloped 
reserves) is greater than the Division's assessed value for these reserves and that the Division did 
not properly apply the discounted cash flow ("DCF") formula in Rule IO when determining a 
value for Redacted The Commission agrees with Redacted that there are genuine issues of 
fact regarding the value of Redacted total reserves, how much of the total value would be 
attributable to developed reserves as opposed to undeveloped reserves, and whether the Division 
properly applied the Rule IO DCF formula when it made its assessment of Redacted 
Nevertheless, these facts are not necessary to answer the legal question before the Commission 
on the motion for partial summary judgment. 
The legal question before the Commission is whether Redacted assessed value 
for the 2003 tax year must be based on an appraisal method that specifically measures the impact 
of its undeveloped reserves. The answer to this question is not dependent on the determination 
of a value for total reserves or a value for the undeveloped reserves alone. Even if reserves have 
an impact that can be ascertained, that effect cannot be incorporated into the assessment unless 
permitted under the law. Certainly, it cannot be denied that Redacted has clearly stated the 
facts it claims to still be in dispute and supplied evidence in the form of an affidavit to support 
these claims. However, although the facts Redacted claims to be material to answer the 
motion for partial summary judgment may be genuinely at issue and relevant to the value of 
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Redacted property, these facts are not material to determine whether Redacted assessed value 
must be derived using a valuation method that measures the impact of its undeveloped reserves. 
For these reasons, the facts relevant to determining the specific values of Redacted total taxable 
property and its various reserves have no impact on the motion. 
In its assessment of oil and gas properties in Utah, the Division contends that it 
has historically, including the 2003 tax year, only measured the income stream of developed oil 
and gas reserves, by employing the discounted cash flow method prescribed in Rule 10. The 
Division states that it has not attempted to talce into account the impact of undeveloped reserves 
owned by anv centrally assessed oil and gas entity, including Redacted Should Redacted 2003 
assessment process be changed to consider an effect attributable to its undeveloped reserves, it 
would be the only centrally assessed taxpayer assessed and taxed on this basis for the 2003 tax 
year. Redacted also contends that these statements are true, while Redacted has chosen not 
to address the veracity of these specific facts other than to say the Division has not proven them 
sufficiently to allow for summary judgment.5 These facts, however, are material ones needed for 
the Commission to address the issue under one of two legal theories: (1) whether the uniformity 
requirements of Utah law forbid the assessment and taxation of Redacted oil and gas property 
for the 2003 tax year using a valuation methodology that measures the impact of its undeveloped 
5 In i t s Opposition to Motion and Oppos i tion to Supporting Mot ion, Redact 
cla ims that because the other par t i es did not s e t forth facts SUPi!Orted 
by the r ecord or other evident iary mate ria l s , as requi r ed by Rule 7(c) (3 ) (A) , 
t here a r e no f a c t s to controve r t. In addition , at t he hearing, Redacted 
counsel s t ated t ha t he did not know i f t hese facts claimed b y t he Di visi on are 
t rue because the Di vision did not s ubmi t a f f idavits as evide nce in suppor t of 
these facts . We also note that Rule 56 specifi c a l l y p rov i de s that the 
submissi on of affi davi ts b y t he party moving for s ummar y j udgment i s optional . 
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reserves; or (2) whether current Utah law forbids the assessment and taxation of oil and gas 
property owned by all centrally assessed taxpayers using a valuation methodology that measures 
the impact of undeveloped reserves. The parties need not agree that there are no genuine issues 
of a material fact for the Commission to determine whether the matter is appropriate for 
summary judgment. However, the Commission may not make this decision unless, upon an 
examination of all evidence, including a consideration of the arguments given and responses to 
questions answered by the parties' respective counsel at the hearing, it determines that no 
material fact has been genuinely controverted. 
We have received no evidence to suggest that the material facts set forth by the 
Division and Redacted are not true, especially as Redacted has not attempted to disprove 
them. However, the Division did not provide affidavits or other evidence to support these facts. 
A summary judgment must be supported by evidence that, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the losing side, establishes that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. 
Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P.2d 790 (Utah 1979). Therefore, the Commission believes it must 
exercise caution before concluding that the evidence on the record is sufficient to deprive Redact 
ed 
the privilege of an evidentiary trial on the legality of considering the appraisal impact of 
undeveloped reserves. For these reasons, the Commission is taking official notice of the 
information found in the Rule IO administrative record retained for public inspection and other 
information, as discussed below, relating to the assessment of oil and gas reserves. 
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Pursuant to UCA §63-46a-2 and Utah Admin. Rule RlS-1-1(5), an agency must 
retain for public inspection the "administrative record" associated with each rule it enacts. 6 In 
Subsection 63-46a-2(1 ), the "administrative record" is defined as "information an agency relies 
upon when making a rule" and should include, among other items, the proposed rule or rule 
change, the public comment received during the comment period, and the agency's response to 
and analysis of such comment. The Commission has maintained for public inspection an 
administrative recor~ pertaining to Rule 10 that contains these items. 
In UCA §63-46b-8(1)(b)(iv), the UAPA provides that an administrative agency 
"may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, of the record of other proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific 
facts within the agency's specialized knowledge." The administrative record for Rule 10 is a 
public record containing the rulemaking proceedings relating to that rule and, in accordance with 
Section 63-46b-8(l)(b)(iv), the Commission takes official notice of the administrative record.7 
6 In Subsection (5) (d) of Utah Admin. Rule RlS-1-1, the Utah Division of 
Administrative Rules establishes that "[t]he hearing record shall be kept with 
and as part of the rule's administrative record in a file available at the agency 
offices for public inspection." While "administrative record" is defined in UCA 
§63-46a-2(1), "hearing record" is defined at Subsection (5) (b) of Rule RlS-1-1 
and consists of "a copy of the proposed rule or rule change, submitted written 
comment, the hearing recording or summary, the list of persons speaking at the 
hearing, and other pertinent documents as determined by the agency." 
7 The Commission takes official notice of the contents of the administrative 
record for Rule 10 to establish what information was available to the Commission 
when it issued its 1992 amendment ruling. However, the Commission is not taking 
official notice that any statements of opinion or disputable facts contained in 
the documents comprising the administrative record are true, as the veracity of 
such information would require an evidentiary hearing to ascertain. Official 
notice of information for this latter purpose would be inappropriate. 
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The Rule 10 administrative record is a volwninous file, but a majority of 
the record is comprised of information relating to an amendment to the rule in 1992. 
Subsequent to a public hearing held in December 1991, the Commission adopted a 
proposed amendment to Rule 10 in February 1992 that changed the valuation method for 
assessing oil and gas properties in Utah from one based on "net proceeds" to one based 
on a DCF model ( effective for the 1992 tax year). The administrative record contains 
dozens of letters and memoranda containing comments from parties both in support of 
and against this proposed rule amendment. 
Not only do these records give insight into the historical assessment of oil 
and gas properties in Utah, but they also describe the confluence of factors that resulted in 
the 1992 rule amendment. The administrative record also shows that the Commission 
knew, at the time of its I 992 ruling, that many parties considered Rule 10 flawed because 
it undervalued oil and gas properties by failing, among other reasons, to separately 
measure the value of undeveloped reserves. However, once the counties withdrew their 
objections to the proposed rule in early 1992, the Commission enacted the amendment at 
the behest of all interested parties. Furthermore, the Commission notes that the record 
contains no information to suggest that a party has subsequently petitioned for a rule 
amendment that would prescribe an appraisal method that would measure the value of 
undeveloped reserves for assessment purposes. A summary of relevant information as 
found in the Rule 10 administrative record to support these conclusions includes the 
following: 
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Information Available to the Public in the Rule 10 Administrative Record 
(references to the valuation of undeveloped reserves are in bold) 
1896-1980's. Utah's Constitution initially provided that net proceeds would be the 
basis for valuing mining property. Although this provision was eliminated from the 
Constitution prior to 1941, oil and gas companies continued to be assessed using the 
net proceeds method until 1992. Until 1987, the statute regarding the valuation of oil 
and gas properties was silent as to what method of valuation should be employed. In 
1987, the Legislature enacted UCA §59-2-201, which provided that the method to 
value the fair market value of productive mining property would be the capitalized 
net revenue method . . . ." However, even with the Constitution and statutory 
changes, the method of assessment prescribed in Rule 10 and used by the Division to 
value oil and gas properties throughout the 1980's remained the net proceeds method. 
(In administrative record, see Letter from Ron Perry to the Commission dated 12-9-
91 ("Ron Perry Letter of 12-9-91 ") and Division Memo to the Commission dated 12-
26-91 ). 
1978. The 400% Formula. At least as far back as 1978, Rule 10 valued oil and gas 
properties at five times their net proceeds (which were assumed under the rule to be 
80% of gross proceeds), using what was commonly referred to as the "400% 
Formula;" i.e., Value= (5) x (net proceeds)= (5) x (.8) x (gross proceeds}= (4) x 
(gross proceeds). A benefit of valuing oil and gas properties with this formula was 
the predictability of the taxpayers' tax costs and the taxing entities' tax revenues, as 
this valuation method was not severely impacted by future cash flows and price 
fluctuations. (See Ron Perry Letter of 12-9-91). 
1983-1987. In 1983, the governor and legislature asked the Tax Commission to 
review the methodology for valuing all property. In 1984, a task force was organized 
to study the best methodology for valuing oil and gas wells. Meetings with the oil 
industry ( and other parties) continued for several years, but were finally dropped in 
1987, when no agreement could be reached. The Division had favored a DCF 
methodology at these meetings. (See Statement of Mike Monson, Director of 
Property Tax Division, at the 12-19-91 public hearing on Rule 10). 
October 1985 and November 1986. The Division proposed that the Commission 
amend Rule IO and replace the 400% Formula with a direct capitalization valuation 
method. The Division provided information suggesting that the 400% Formula was 
not related to "fair market value" and, thus, was indefensible in court. In a memo, 
Mike Monson indicated that the oil industry and an ad hoc committee established by 
former Tax Commissioner Gary Cornia would object to the direct capitalization 
approach because they supported a change to a DCF methodology instead. 
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January 5, 1987. The Commission sent a memo to the Division, informing it that 
the Commission would not submit the Division's proposed Rule IO amendments that 
incorporated a direct capitalization formula to the Division of Administrative Rules 
("DAR"). The Commission had indicated that it had given the Utah Petroleum 
Association assurance that it would not adopt the Division's proposed amended rule 
incorporating a direct capitalization method without first meeting with Gruy Comia' s 
group to hear their concerns with the proposal. 
1987. Section 59-2-201 was enacted by the Legislature in 1987 (effective 1/1/88), 
wherein subsection (3) provided that "[the] method for determining the fair market 
value of productive mining property is the capitalized net revenue method or any 
other valuation method the commission believes or the taxpayer demonstrates to the 
commission's satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative of the fair market value of 
the mining property." Prior to the enactment of this statute, Section 59-5-61 only 
required that owners of valuable hydrocarbon deposits file information concerning 
their property and its value with the Commission. (See Ron Perry Letter of 12-9-91 ). 
1989. In 1989, Rule 10 was modified to state (new language underlined): 
The reasonable taxable value of productive underground oil and gas 
rights shall be determined by the [ 400% Formula] or such other 
valuation method that the Tax Commission believes to be reasonably 
determinative of the property's fair market value. 
Oil companies began to challenge their property valuations, as determined 
with the 400% Formula, under the argument that there were other valuation methods 
that would better reflect their properties' fair market value. (See various documents 
that show that many oil and gas companies appealed their assessments for the 1989, 
1990, and 1991 tax years. Other information obtained from a letter submitted on 
behalf of Utah Counties dated 11-13-91). 
October 9, 1990. The Division submitted a proposed revision of Rule 10 to the 
Commission that employed a DCF model to value oil and gas companies instead of 
the 400% Formula. On January 31, 1991,the Commission informed the Division that 
it was rejecting its request for a rule change. 
May 10, 1991. The Division again submitted a proposed revision of Rule 10 to the 
Commission, which would employ a DCF model to value oil and gas companies 
instead of the 400% Formula. 
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September 1991. The five oil producing counties (Redacted 
) and their school districts were advised that there had 
been a proposal to amend Rule 10 and the Tax Commission would shortly begin 
official consideration of the proposed changes, which, if adopted, would hopefully go 
into effect on January 1, 1992. 
October 16, 1991. In a memo to the Commission addressing the fiscal impact of 
implementing a DCF valuation model, Mike Monson estimated that oil and gas 
property assessed values could be reduced in the worst case scenario or might remain 
the same in the best case scenario. But, he recommended the change because the 
Attorney General's Office had infonned the Division there was a good chance th~ 
400% Fonnula would be found to be unconstitutional because it was not related to 
"fair market value." 
On this date, the Commission approved, for submission to DAR, a revision to 
Rule 10 incorporating a DCF model to assess oil and gas properties. On October 31, 
1991, the Commission submitted the proposed amendments to Rule 10 to DAR. 
October 31 - December 19, 1991. The Commission received comments from a 
number of parties both for and against the proposed amendment to Rule 10. Letters 
from the counties and school districts affected by the amended rule change 
encouraged the Commission not to adopt the proposed rule, but to endorse the 400% 
Formula instead. 
Letters from various oil and gas companies and related organizations were 
received in support of the amendments to Rule 10. Among the parties supporting the 
rule amendments were the Utah Petroleum Association and most major oil and gas 
companies. Some of these companies included Amoco Corporation, Phillips 
Petroleum Company, Chevron USA, Inc., Meridian Oil, Inc., Mobil Exploration an 
Production North America, Southland Royalty Company, Texaco Exploration and 
Production, Inc., Union Pacific Resources Company, and Coastal Oil and Gas 
Corporation. These organizations stressed that the proposed amendment to Rule 10, 
incorporating a DCF valuation model, was the result of seven years of meetings 
between the companies, the counties, and the Division and that the current Rule 1 Q 
did not adhere to any of the three recognized methods of determining fair market 
value (i.e., cost, income, sales approaches). 
In a letter submitted by Amoco Corporation in support of the rule amendment 
was a December 1986 publication entitled "The Salomon Brothers Oil and Gas 
Reserve Valuation Model: A Systematic Approach to the Valuation of Petroleum 
Reserves." The model in this document assumed that "proved developed reserves" 
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are to be developed until depleted and that "proved undeveloped reserves" are 
to be developed on a steady, straight-line basis over a ten-year period. 
Hal Heaton, a professor at BYU, endorsed the proposed rule amendment, 
stating that the 400% Formula "probably has resulted in huge errors in its estimation 
of fair market value" and that "discounted cash flow is the consistently superior and 
most fundamental approach to valuation." 
November 26, 1991. The Utah Association of Counties ("UAC") submitted a 
resolution requesting the Commission not to adopt the proposed Rule 10 amendments 
until the counties had time to evaluate whether the 400% Formula was supportable 
and if there were more viable alternatives than the DCF method. 
December 9, 1991. Commissioner Ron Perry, Summit County Commissioner, on 
behalf of the Five County Oil and Gas Valuation Task Force ("County Task Force") 
( composed of representatives from the five oil producing counties, their respective 
school districts, and the Utah State Office of Education), submitted a letter opposing 
the proposed rule amendments. 
In the letter, the County Task Force acknowledged that the 400% Formula 
did not assess a value to either "proven but undeveloped reserves" or "undrilled 
leases" and commented that nothing in the Utah Constitution or Utah law 
prohibited the taxation of these assets. Nevertheless, the County Task Force asked 
the Commission to forego the proposed amendments to Rule 10 and retain the 400% 
Formula, stating that it was a fair and predictable means to tax oil and gas properties. 
(Note that an unsigned draft of this document was also submitted to the Commission 
on November 13, 1991 and was provided as an exhibit in Redacted Reply 
Supporting Motion). 
The County Task Force also argued that the proposed DCF method 
undervalued underground oil and gas deposits and lead to wide fluctuations in 
assessed values and tax dollars from year to year. In addition, it criticized the 
· - proposed DCF model because it did not include cash flow from "predictable 
future drilling," i.e., proven but undeveloped reserves and undrilled leases. The. 
County Task Force stated that while its members had no philosophical objection to 
using a DCF model to value oil and gas properties, any proposed rule change 
adopting such a valuation method should include a number of elements, 
including the valuation of undrilled leases and undeveloped reserves. The 
County Task Force argued that if value was estimated by projecting future cash 
flows, that estimate must include all future cash flows, including those that will 
come from assets not yet in production. 
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The County Task Force also argued that the 400% Formula could be 
considered a "unitary" appraisal concept, which would estimate a value for all oil and 
gas properties, whether or not productive, while a DCF valuation concept would only 
value those properties for which revenue and cost information were anal)'Zed. 
December 10, 1991. In a letter received on behalf of Summit County, Redacted 
( counsel for Redacted in the present matter) requested an opportunity to 
speak and make a presentation at the public rule hearing on December 19, 1991, in 
opposition to the proposed rule. He included with his letter a copy of the document 
that the County Task Force submitted to the Commission. Again, included in this 
document were statements that the "most comprehensive criticism of proposed 
Rule 10" is that it ignores undeveloped values and that an acceptable rule 
should contain a number of elements, including the "valuation of undrilled 
leases and undeveloped reserves." 
December 19, 1991. On this date, the public hearing was held on the proposed 
amendments to Rule 10. At the hearing, Howard Stephenson, on behalf of the Utah 
Taxpayers Association, spoke in favor of the proposed rule and "urge[ d] the 
Cornmission to act now and to not hesitate in addressing this issue ... [ and to] settle 
this matter and not let it be drawn out in the courts." 
Commissioner Ron Perry spoke on behalf of the County Task Force and 
urged the Commission to allow other valuation methods to be studied prior to 
adopting the proposed DCF amendments. He requested that this ruling not be put in 
effect for six months to allow the County Task Force time to answer unresolved 
questions. Others, including Redacted , as counsel for UAC and the County 
Task Force, spoke against the proposed amendments. Opponents argued that the 
DCF method did not capture the effect of undeveloped leases and expressed 
concern over losing as much as 60% of their oil and gas property tax value. 
Prior to making a decision to adopt the proposed rule, the Commission 
allowed the parties seven days to submit additional information. 
December 26, 1991. The Division submitted a memo to the Commission addressing 
the valuation of oil and gas properties in other states. The memo noted that of those 
states employing a valuation method similar to the 400% Formula (a gross or net 
proceeds method), only Utah did not have Constitution or statutory provisions calling 
for a valuation method based on a multiple or fraction of the gross or net proceeds. 
Utah's Constitution and statutory provisions more closely matched those of Texas, 
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California, and Kansas, all of which employed a DCF or other similar valuation 
method to arrive at fair market value. 
January 8, 1992. The Commission began infonning interested parties that, after 
receiving input at the public hearing, it had decided to delay implementation of the 
proposed amendments to Rule 10 for a period not to exceed six months to allow the 
counties time to analyze and possibly suggest a better alternative to the DCF 
methodology in the proposed rule. 
February 4-12, 1992. The Commission received letters from the taxing entities that 
had opposed the Rule IO amendments (including Redacted , UAC, and the 
County Task Force), whereby they informed the Commission that they were 
withdrawing their objections to the proposed amendments to Rule 10. The 
withdrawal of their objections were part of an agreement between the taxing 
entities and the oil and gas companies to settle property tax appeals pending for 
the 1989, 1990, and 1991 tax years. These letters also indicated that the taxing 
entities had agreed that the DCF valuation model, as proposed by the Division, 
should be used to value oil and gas companies for the 1992 tax year. (Note: letters 
reciting terms of agreement between these parties are also included in the Rule 10 
administrative record). 
February 11, 1992. The Commission received a letter from Lyle Anderson, an 
attorney hired by Grand County and San Juan Co. School District. He alerted the 
Commission that while his clients had entered into the agreement to withdraw their 
opposition to the Rule IO amendments, they did so with the understanding that the 
taxing entities could conduct a study and would be given a fair hearing on their 
proposals to amend the rule further to address a number of issues, one of which 
would be "[o]btaining information that will permit valuation of proved 
developed and probable reserves, in addition to producing reserves." 
February 12, 1992. The Commission adopted the amendments to Rule I 0, which 
replaced the 400% Formula with a DCF valuation model beginning with the 1992 tax 
year. 
February 14, 1992. The Commission responded to Mr. Anderson, the attorney for 
Grand County, welcoming the information the taxing entities' study would 
produce and informing him that administrative rulemaking procedures in Utah 
allowed any interested party to submit a request for a revision to an existing 
rule. 
-32-
•• DEPO000807 
Appeal Nos. 03-0937 and 03-0963 
November 13, 1992. Commission submitted proposed Rule 10 amendments to DAR 
that addressed the definitions of"product price," "production asset," and "costs," as 
used in the Rule 10 DCF model, to become effective for the 1993 tax year. 
January 1, 1993. The amendments to definitions used in the DCF valuation model 
in Rule 1 0 became effective on this date. The provisions of Rule 10 have not 
subsequently changed, except for minor amendments in 1993 and 1994. 
1993 - Present. There is no documentation in the Rule 10 administrative record 
to indicate that the counties or their representatives submitted proposed 
amendments to Rule 10 subsequent to the adoption of the DCF model in 1992 or 
that any party, for that matter, has provided subsequent studies concerning the 
valuation of oil and gas properties, including techniques that would capture the 
effect for proved undeveloped reserves or un-drilled leases. 
The chronology and record of events regarding the implementation of Rule 
10 shows that the Counties were not only aware that the DCF valuation model in Rule 10 
would not measure the effect of undeveloped reserves for assessment purposes, but also 
that they tacitly acquiesced by withdrawing their objections and failing to support a 
different methodology thereafter. 
In addition to the facts contained in the Rule 10 administrative record, the 
Commission has administrative familiarity with the assessment of oil and gas properties 
as the agency responsible for those assessments. As the agency given the powers and 
duties to administer and supervise the tax laws of this state, the Commission is aware and 
also takes official notice of the fact that value that might be attributable to undeveloped _ 
reserves has not been specifically accounted for in appraisal methods used in Utah under 
Rule 10. The Commission is also aware that there are multiple centrally assessed oil and 
gas entities other than Redacted that own undeveloped reserves in Utah. The knowledge 
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of these facts that the Commission possesses through its experience in administering and 
supervising the assessment of oil and gas entities further reinforces the certainty of that 
knowledge that is found in the Rule 10 administrative record. 
The following statement of facts (in underline) are the material facts needed to 
address, on the Division's motion for partial summary judgment, the legal issue of whether a 
valuation method that measures the effect of Redacted undeveloped oil and gas reserves is required 
or permitted for its assessment and taxation for the 2003 tax year and, although these facts are not 
admitted by all parties, are not genuinely controverted: 
Statement of Facts 
1. Under Rule 10. historically and including the 2003 tax year, the valuation 
model used to determine the fair market value of property owned by a centrally assessed oil and 
gas company, for assessment and taxation purposes, has measured the impact of value 
attributable to its developed oil and gas reserves, but has not measured the impact on value 
attributable to its undeveloped oil and gas reserves. 
The Commission has participated in prior rulemaking proceedings regarding Rule 
10 and, in 1992, formally adopted the DCF valuation method that is currently used to assess oil 
and gas properties in Utah. The Rule 10 administrative record clearly indicates that the 
Commission was aware, when it adopted the amendment in 1992, that this DCF model was not 
intended to measure the impact of undeveloped oil and gas reserves. The administrative record 
also shows that, since the 1992 amendment to Rule 10, no party has submitted, for the 
Commission to consider in the rulemaking process, studies examining other valuation methods 
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that might measure the impact of undeveloped reserves. Nor has any party proposed amendments 
to Rule 10 that would provide for such methods. Given the information of which the 
Commission takes official notice, the assertions of the Division and Redacted 
lack of evidence to the contrary, the Commission finds this fact to be uncontroverted. 
2. Redacted is a centrally assessed oil and gas company. For the 2003 tax 
year, the Division assessed Redacted oil and gas property using a methodology that measured 
the impact on value attributable to its developed reserves, but did not measure an impact of its 
undeveloped reserves. 
Given the information of which the Commission takes official notice, the 
assertions of the Division and Redacted lack of evidence to the contrary, 
the Commission finds this fact to be uncontroverted. 
3. There are numerous centrally assessed oil and gas entities in Utah that own 
undeveloped oil and gas reserves other than Redacted . 
The Commission has participated in many tax appeals with such entities. Given 
the information of which the Commission takes official notice, the assertions of the Division and 
Redacted lack of evidence to the contrary, the Commission finds this fact 
to be uncontroverted. 
By deciding that the above facts are the ones material to answering the Division's 
legal question and finding that there exist no genuine issues of any of these facts, the 
Commission finds that the Division's motion for partial summary judgment on the legal question 
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posed satisfies the requirements of Rule 56. Having determined the matter appropriate to address 
in partial summary judgment, we proceed to the second determination, the legal issue itself. 
B. Legal Question - Is the Division required or permitted to apply a valuation 
method that measures the impact of Redacted undeveloped reserves for 
assessment and taxation purposes for the 2003 tax year? 
The underlying issue in the Division's motion is whether the valuation 
methodology used to assess and tax Redacted property for the 2003 tax year must measure the 
effect of undeveloped reserves. As we have determined that this issue may be addressed in 
partial summary judgment instead of in an evidentiary proceeding, we proceed to address the 
issue regarding Redacted undeveloped reserves under the two legal theories proposed. These 
are: 1) would using a valuation methodology that measured the effect of undeveloped reserves to 
determine Redacted assessed value for the 2003 tax year violate Utah's uniform and equal 
assessment and taxation provisions, and, if not; 2) under Utah law in effect as the lien date, must 
a valuation methodology used to centrally assess oil and gas property measure the value 
attributable to undeveloped reserves. 
Art. XIII, Sec. 2(1) of the Utah Constitution requires that all tangible property, not 
exempt under the laws of the United States or under the Utah Constitution, be assessed and taxed at a 
uniform and equal rate. The Commission need not address whether any of Redacted property is 
exempt. No evidence is presented that undeveloped reserves are exempt from taxation under federal 
law. Nor does any party argue that undeveloped reserves are exempt under the Utah Constitution, 
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which in Art. XIII, Sec. 3 exempts certain specified properties from taxation in Utah with no mention 
of oil and gas property.8 
UCA §59-2-201(1)(e) provides that the Commission shall assess at 100% of fair 
market value all mines and mining claims, except in cases where the Commission determines the 
mining claim is used for other than mining purposes. Historically, the Commission has assessed 
property owned by oil and gas companies, as well as companies that mine other minerals, under this 
section of the Utah Code. The Legislature has further provided in Section 59-2-201(3) that: 
[t]he method for determining the fair market value of productive mining 
property is the capitalized net revenue method or any other valuation method 
the commission believes, or the taxpayer demonstrates to the commission's 
satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative of the fair market value of the 
mining property .... 
We note that in UCA §59-2-201(3) the Legislature has provided the 
Commission some latitude in approving a valuation method to determine the fair market 
value of productive mining property for assessment and taxation purposes. While the statute 
specifies that the method may be the capitalized net revenue method, it offers, in the 
alternative, that the Commission may choose a method that it believes, or that has been 
demonstrated to its satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative of the fair market value of 
productive mining property. 
Given this latitude, the Commission adopted the amendments to Rule 10 in 1992, 
which incorporated a DCF valuation model to assess an oil and gas entity's taxable tangible 
8 Altho u gh on e of Redacted argume nts is that unde ve l oped r e serves ma y b e 
considered " intangible" property not subject to property tax assessment, the 
Commission's ruling i s not dependen t on a deter mination of this issue . 
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property. The model detennines fair market value for assessment and taxation purposes by 
considering the income stream attributable to an entity's developed reserves, but not its 
undeveloped reserves. Although there have been a few subsequent amendments to the rule, they 
have mainly refined the model adopted in 1992. No amendment has addressed the measurement 
of the effect attributable to undeveloped reserves for assessment purposes. 
One could argue that the Commission was precluded, under the statute, from 
adopting a rule that would capture any value attributable to undeveloped reserves because UCA 
§59-2-201(3) only provides for the assessment of productive mining property. If this were true, 
Rule 10, which was amended in 1992 to ascribe value to developed reserves (those in production 
or for which a plan for production existed as of the lien date), would arguably over-assess oil and 
gas property. This is because it attributes value not only to property that is productive as of the 
lien date (reserves in production), but also to property not yet productive as of the lien date 
(reserves not in production but for which a plan of production existed as of the lien date). 
However, the Commission does not believe the Rule IO valuation method over-assesses oil and 
gas property for this reason because it interprets the statute otherwise. 
The Commission believes that the word "productive" in UCA §59-2-20 I (3) has 
broader application than just those reserves literally in production as of the lien date. Certainly, 
such was the case in 1992 when the Commission adopted Rule 10, which measures the effect on 
value for a portion of reserves that are not in production as of the lien date (i.e., those reserves 
not in production but for which a plan of production exists as of the lien date). 
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Redacted however, claims that Rule 10 fails to provide for a methodology to 
measure additional value attributable to proved undeveloped reserves, another portion of reserves 
that are not productive as of the lien date (i.e., those reserves neither in production nor for which 
a plan of production exists as of the lien date). A similar complaint was presented in opposition 
to Rule 10 when it was proposed in 1991. However, the Commission amended the rule anyway, 
and in so doing, chose a valuation method that it believed to be reasonably determinative of the 
fair market value of productive mining property, as specifically authorized by the Legislature. 
The fact that the Commission adopted a valuation method that excluded value specifically 
attributable to undeveloped reserves does not mean that it determined all or any part of such 
reserves to be exempt from taxation under Utah law. It merely means that the Commission 
considered the Rule 10 valuation model to be reasonably determinative of the fair market value 
of productive mining property even though the model did not quantify the effect on value of 
undeveloped reserves. As of the lien date, January 1, 2003, the relevant provisions of Rule 10 
that were adopted in 1992 are still in effect. Those provisions were adopted with the knowledge 
that the DCF valuation model would measure the effect on value attributable to developed 
reserves, but not to undeveloped reserves. 
Given the Utah law in effect as of the lien date, January 1, 2003, the Commission 
proceeds to address the two legal theories relating to the taxability of Redacted undeveloped 
reserves for the 2003 tax year. 
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1. Would the use of a valuation method that specifically measures the 
impact of Redacted undeveloped reserves for assessment and taxation 
purposes for the 2003 tax year result in a violation of the federal and state 
equal protection provisions? 
The Utah Constitution in art. XIII, Sec. 2(1) provides that taxable tangible 
property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate. Due to this provision, Redacted 
argues that it would be unconstitutional to ascribe value to Redacted undeveloped reserves for 
the 2003 tax year because no other Utah centrally assessed oil and gas entity was assessed and 
taxed in 2003 on a value that included a measurement of the impact attributable to undeveloped 
reserves. 
In Rio Algom Corp. v. San Juan County, 681 P.2d 184 (Utah 1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court quoted from San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973), in 
which the United States Supreme Court provided: 
No scheme of taxation, whether the tax is imposed on property, income, or 
purchases of goods and services, has yet been devised which is free of all 
discriminatory impact. In such a complex arena in which no perfect 
alternatives exist, the Court does well not to impose too rigorous a 
standard of scrutiny lest all local fiscal schemes become subjects of 
criticism under the Equal Protection Clause. 
Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court also recognized that "[w]hile absolute equality and 
uniformity in the assessment of property is not practicable, a requirement of reasonable 
uniformity and equality is essential." See Kennecott v. Tax Comm'n, 799 P.2d 1156 (Utajl 1990), 
quoting Harmer v. State Tax Comm'n, 452 P.2d 876,879 (Utah 1969). 
When Rule 10 was adopted in 1992, the Commission understood that the DCF 
valuation model would measure the effect of the income stream from developed reserves to 
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assess mining properties owned by centrally assessed oil and gas entities located in Utah, but 
would not measure the effect of their undeveloped reserves. This policy was adopted only after 
no participant in the rulemaking procedure proposed a model that included a measure of the 
effect of such reserves. The rule has been applied in this manner ever since, including the 2003 
tax year, in which the Division did not measure the effect of any centrally assessed oil and gas 
entity' s undeveloped reserves. Were the Commission to determine that Redacted 2003 
assessed value had to reflect a quantification of the impact of its undeveloped reserves, it would 
be singled out as the only centrally assessed oil and gas entity assessed on this basis. Redacted 
contends that such an action would violate the principle of uniformity and the equal protection 
provisions of the state and federal constitutions, even if the measurement of the value attributable 
to its undeveloped reserves, in addition to developed reserves, represented the property's fair 
market value. 
A set of circumstances with certain similarities arose in Allegheny Pittsburgh 
Coal Co. v. County Com 'n, 109 S.Ct. 633 (1989), in which the United States Supreme Court 
determined that the assessment of a coal company in West Virginia, although based upon its 
recent selling price, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution because it subjected the coal company to taxes not imposed on others 
of the same class. West Virginia's Constitution provided that the taxation of property shall be 
equal and uniform and in proportion to its value, provisions similar to those found in the Utah 
Constitution. In Allegheny, a West Virginia county assessor assessed fee, surface, and mineral 
interests owned by a coal company at a value based on their recent selling price. Her practice 
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was to set the appraised value of properties at the declared price at which it last sold, and while 
some adjustments were made to properties not recently sold, these adjustments were nominal in 
effect. As a result, the practice resulted in gross disparities in the assessed value of generally 
comparable property, with the Petitioner' s property being assessed 8 to 35 times higher than 
other comparable property. 
The West Virginia County argued that it used exceedingly accurate information, 
the price at which the property had sold, to assess the property at its true market value. In the 
case before the Commission, Redacted recently purchased the oil and gas properties at issue. 
However, should Redacted be assessed and taxed for the 2003 tax year based on the recent 
selling price of its assets, such an assessment may be unconstitutional if it reflects the value of 
undeveloped reserves and the assessments of other centrally assessed taxpayers were not adjusted 
to reflect the value of their undeveloped reserves. 
In Allegheny, the Supreme Court stated that "[a]s long as general adjustments are 
accurate enough over a short period of time to equalize the differences in proportion between the 
assessments of a class of property holders, the Equal Protection Clause is satisfied." The 
adjustments to other properties of the same class in Allegheny were minimal, however, and the 
Court found the assessment method under review to be unconstitutional because it led to 
"taxation which in fact bears unequally on persons or property of the same class." Quoting 
Charleston Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182 (1945). 
In considering Redacted case, the Commission notes that numerous other 
centrally assessed Utah oil and gas entities were assessed in 2003 without any value being 
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specifically ascribed to their undeveloped reserves. Regardless of what happens to Redacted the 
2003 assessed values of the other Utah oil and gas entities will not be adjusted because the tax 
rolls for 2003 have already closed. To consider the impact on value attributable to undeveloped 
reserves owned by Redacted because of its recent purchase would result in it being assessed, and 
consequently taxed, in a manner that would bear unequally on persons or property of the same 
class. Adjusting Redacted 2003 assessed value due to a completely unique valuation 
methodology without ensuring that like taxpayers would be similarly burdened would be 
unconstitutional because the transitional adjustments made to the other centrally assessed Utah 
oil and gas entities would not be just minimal, which the Court found unconstitutional in 
Allegheny, they would be nonexistent in this instance. 
The Court in Allegheny further explained that when viewed in isolation, the 
assessment of the Petitioner's property may fully comply with West Virginia law. Nevertheless, 
"[t]he equal protection clause ... protects the individual from state action which selects him out 
for discriminatory treatment by subjecting him to taxes not imposed on others of the same class." 
See Allegheny, quoting Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620,623 (1946). Similarly, whether 
or not Utah law provides for ilie assessment of undeveloped oil and gas reserves, Redacted is 
protected from the state selecting it out as the only centrally assessed oil and gas entity whose 
undeveloped reserves would be subject to taxation for the 2003 tax year. 
A recent Utah Supreme Court case also appears to support this conclusion. In 
Mountain Ranch Estates v. Utah State Tax Commission, 2004 UT 86 (2004), the Court found 
that a taxpayer assessed at fair market value could not establish a violation of its constitutional 
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right to a uniform and equal assessment without providing evidence of more than one 
comparable property with a valuation disparity.9 However, the Court stated that "[t]he presence 
of multiple unfairly advantaged properties necessarily raises the suspicion of a potential 
inequality" and "[w]here an accurate fair market value assessment stands apart from a group of 
undervalued comparable properties, valuation accuracy may not be used to defend the otherwise 
aberrant assessment." In the matter before the Commission, neither Redacted nor any of the 
other multiple centrally assessed oil and gas entities have been assessed based on a valuation or 
appraisal method that measures the effect of their undeveloped reserves. Should Redacted 
. assessment be increased to reflect the value attributable to such reserves, all other entities with 
similar reserves would be unfairly advantaged. Even were it shown that Redacted fair market 
value, as defined by law, should be based in part on factors attributable to its undeveloped 
reserves, such an assessment would stand apart from a group of undervalued comparable 
properties and be deemed an unconstitutional, aberrant assessment. 
For these reasons, we find that, for purposes of assessing and taxing Redacted for 
the 2003 tax year, a valuation method that reflects the impact attributable to all or a portion of its 
undeveloped reserves would violate the federal and state equal protection provisions because it 
9 In Mountain Ranch Estates, the Court addressed the evidence that must 
be established before a taxpayer claiming a valuation disparity is entitled to 
statutory relief under UCA §59-2-1006(4). Furthermore, the Court stated that 
the constitutional issue "turns on the same theory" as the statutory one, 
finding that evidence of more than one comparable property with a disparate 
valuation is also required to establish a violation of the constitutional 
equal protection provisions. We do not addre ss the statutory remedy in the 
matter at issue because that remedy requires evidence not in the record, 
specifically evidence of percentage differences in assessments. However, such 
evidence is not required to address the cons t itutional issue. 
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would result in Redacted being the only centrally assessed oil and gas entity subject to such 
assessment and taxation. Accordingly, we find that a valuation methodology, which relies on 
specifically measuring any portion of the impact of undeveloped reserves, may not be used to 
determine Redacted fair market value for purposes of assessment and taxation for the 2003 tax 
year.10 
2. Does Utah law in effect on January 1, 2003 forbid, in general, a 
valuation method that measures the impact of undeveloped reserves in 
establishing, for assessment and taxation purposes, the fair market value of 
centrally assessed oil and gas properties? 
As we have already determined that Redacted undeveloped reserves are not to be 
considered in 2003 because of the state and federal equal protection provisions, we do not reach 
this portion of the analysis. Nevertheless, the Commission takes this opportunity to make some 
observations about the Rule 10 DCF formula and the process by which it was derived. Earlier, 
we took official notice of information concerning the 1992 amendment to Rule 10, under which 
centrally assessed oil and gas properties have been valued for well over a decade. Without 
question, the process that led to the adoption of the Rule 10 amendments in 1992 was a lengthy 
and difficult endeavor for which there appeared to be no one solution that would satisfy all 
10 Redacted asserts that because certain proved undeveloped reserves 
were held to be taxable in a recent Cali f ornia case , Maples v . Kern County 
Assessment Appeals Board (2002) 103 Cal.App . 4thl72 , such reserves should also 
be taxable in Utah . However , in that case , California ' s administrative rule 
specifically defi ned and required the taxa t ion of "proved reserves , " which 
included both "proved developed reserves" and "proved undevel oped reserves." 
No equal protection issue was addressed in the Cali fornia case , which 
determined the reser ves in question to fa l l within definit i onal par ameters 
already i ntended by its r ule. Utah's Rule 10, which sets forth a different 
assessment strategy, was not intended to measure the impact of undeveloped 
reserves. The Commission finds the California case to have n o impact on its 
decision in this matter . 
- 45 -
DEPO000820 
Appeal Nos. 03-0937 and 03-0963 
parties. However, after much effort, the parties finally agreed to an administrative rule by which 
centrally assessed oil and gas companies would be assessed. The counties enumerated several 
concerns with the 1992 proposed amendments to Rule 10, one of these being that the DCF model 
specified in the rule did not provide for a value based on the measure of the impact of 
undeveloped reserves. Nevertheless, they withdrew their opposition to the rule and asked the 
Commission to adopt it for the 1992 tax year, even though the Commission had guaranteed the 
counties a period of least six months to obtain studies and suggest a better valuation method. 
Even when the counties withdrew their opposition to the rule, the Commission made clear that it 
would consider in the rulemaking process any future valuation method the counties might present 
to address their concerns. The counties have yet to submit, for consideration in the rulemaking 
process, another valuation method that might reasonably be determinative of the fair market 
value of oil and gas property, as set forth in UCA §59-2-201(3).11 
When so many years of study and negotiation were required to generate a rule that 
would be used to assess the property of a specific industry, when all interested parties were 
afforded an opporturiity and took that opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process to 
create that rule, and when all parties, and presumably the Legislature, has had knowledge of the 
rule's possible limitations or deficiencies for 12 years without acting to change such deficiencies 
1 1 UCA § 63-4 6a -12 allows an i n terested p a rty to p etit i on f o r a cha nge i n 
an administr ativ e r ule . Redacted in its Opposition to Mot i on , u r ges the 
Divi s i on not to attempt to use t he appeals p roce ss to change Rul e 10 , b ut t o 
r e que s t a rulemaking procedu r e if that wa s its int enti on. Iron ical l y , it 
appears t hat i t i s Redacted t ha t is t ryi ng t o effect a rul e chanqe 
t hrough the appeal s p r o c ess. However, we do not consider Redacted 
Pet i t i on i n t h is matte r t o be an i ndirect Se c tion 63-46a-12 request for agency 
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through legislative or rulemaking action, the Commission would hesitate to act unilaterally and 
negate such a long-standing policy without a change oflegislation or case law. In addition, 
strong arguments exist that, under UCA §63-46b-16( 4)(h), a court might find reason to overturn 
any attempt by the Commission to reverse this long-standing course of regulation through the 
issuance of an order, finding such unilateral action to be contrary to either the agency's rule or to 
its prior practice. For these reasons, we do not believe that the hearing process is the optimal 
venue to request a change in policy to assess property never previously assessed. However, 
because we have determined that the assessment of Redacted undeveloped reserves for the 2003 
tax year would be a violation of equal protection, we do not reach the issue of whether or not a 
policy change is needed to ensure the valuation method in Rule 10 is reflective of the fair market 
value of oil and gas properties. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, both the Division' s Motion to Strike and its Motion to 
Dismiss are denied. However, the Division' s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted and 
the Commission finds that the assessment of undeveloped reserves owned by Redacted for the 2003 
tax year would violate the federal and state equal protection provisions. Accordingly, Redacted 
assessment and taxation for the 2003 tax year may not be based on a valuation method that 
specifically quantifies the impact attributable to undeveloped reserves. All other issues concerning 
the assessment and taxation of Redacted property for the 2003 tax year are reserved for an 
evidentiary hearing to be scheduled at a later time. It is so ordered. 
acti on t o amend Rule 10 to allow for the asse ssment of undevelope d r eser ves . 
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DATED this {'SfJJ day of N01}{rn.lHA 2004. 
Administrative Law Judge 
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BY ORDER OF THE COMMISSION. 
The undersigned have reviewed this motion and concur in this decision. 
Ji:;-tt, N DATED this _ _.__ J __ day of_...J,......:...~"'"""i/){'--"'"'J,._._P,_1)J-t1'---"....__ __ 2004. 
Commissioner 
KRC/03-0937.sjd 
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November 13, 1991 
Honorable R.H. Hansen, Chairman 
Utah State Tax Commission 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84134 
Re: Proposed Revision to R884-24-10P 
Dear Chairman Hansen: 
The Five County Oil and Gas Valuation Task Force, 
composed of representatives from Duchesne, Grand, San Juan, 
Summit and Uintah.counties, their constituent school districts, 
and the Utah State Office of Education presents the following 
written comments on the October 31, 1991, proposa1 to modify 
R884-24-10P ("Rule lOP"). Rul.e lOP governs the val.uation of 
underground rights in land that contains deposits of oil and gas. 
Background 
Section 59-2-201, Utah Code (1991) requires t~at the 
fair market value of productive mining property be determined by 
the capitalized net revenue method or any other valuation method 
the commission believes, or the taxpayer demonstrates to the 
commission's satisfaction, to be reasonably determinative of the 
fair market value of the mining property. This statutory 
., 
language was enacted in 1987 to become effective January 1, 1988. 
Prior to that time, predecessor Section 59-5-61,~Utah Code r1965) 
require~ only that owners of valuable hydrocarbon deposits file 
annually with the tax commission a sworn statement in detail of 
the property owned and the value thereof, together with such 
other information and in such form as the tax cormnission 
required. 
Dating back to at least 1978, the Utah State Tax 
Commission has applied a regul.ation like current Rul.e lOP to 
value oi1 land gas properties. At that time, metalliferous mines 
were valued at ten times1 their net proceeds in the previous 
year. In apparent recognition of t~e special character of oil 
and gas properties, Rule lOP applied a multiple of only five to 
hydrocarbon deposits. At the. same time, for reasons that appear 
to rel.ate to a "rule of thumb" then in vogue in the oil and gas 
industry, Rule lOP assumed that net proceeds were 80% of gross 
revenues. Thus the "400% Formula" that currently serves as the 
basis for assessment of hydrocarbon ·properties is calculated as 5 
x 0.80 x gross revenues for the previous year. 2 
The 400% Formula has several distinct advantages for 
taxpayers. First, because the formula always.looks at past 
1In actuality, sin~e all property was assessed at twenty 
percent of its fair market value before January 1, 1986, the 
actual multiple prior to that date was two times net proceeds. 
For ease of reference, this comment assumes that all properties 
have always been valued at full value. ~ 
2In recognition of the greater cost of p~oducing from 
particular areas and in particuiar ways, Rule lOP provides for a 
20% reduction for oil properties in the Greater Al.tamont/Bluebell 
field, and a 10% reduction for properties in.secondary recovery. 
Federal,' state and Indian royalties and federal windfall profits 
taxes were also permitted as deductions. 
v;g. 
. 
production, the taxpayers enjoy a one year delay in the payment 
of property taxes that continues throughout the life of the 
property. second, the tax is predictable and can be included in 
economic analyses as a percentage of production. Third, though 
somewhat arbitrary, the 400% Formu1a does not make any attempt to 
predict future cash fJ.ows. During the period from 19 7 9 to 19 a·s , 
when oil companies were projecting oil. prices in excess of $100 
per barrel., and takeovers in the oil industry were rampant, the 
400% Formula generated extremely conservative property values. 
Finally, the 400% Formula made no attempt to reach values of 
undeveloped reserves, values which can frequently be substantial 
The predictability of the 400% Formula also was a 
positive factor ·for counties and school districts that must pl.an 
for regular expenditures regardless of the price of oil. School 
districts, in particular, relied on the 400% Formula in incurring 
bonded indebtedness to construct and improve schools in oil boom 
areas. For this predictability, counties and school districts 
were wil1ing to delay property tax receipts for a year and give 
up the potential tax bonanza that discounted cash flow might then 
have generated. 
The sharp drop in oil prices in early 1986 sent a shock 
.. 
wave through the oil industry. Oil companies immediately began 
casting about for ways to reduce their .costs.~ Exploration 
expenditures were the first to be cut, but the companies 
eventually got around to looking at property tax payments. 
.3 
Beginning in 1989, oil companies beg~ to challenge their 
property valuations under the 400% Formula. They were aided in 
this effort by the 1989 amendment to Ruie lOP that stated: 
The reasonable taxable value of productive 
underground oil and ga.s rights shall be determined 
by the [400% Formula] or such other valuation method 
that the Tax Commission be1 ieves to be reasonably 
determ;native of the oroperty's fair market value. 
·o/ 
The five oil producing counties in Utah, and their 
school districts,· continued to rely on t~e 400% Formula in their 
budgeting and bonding decisions, ei~~er ignorant of the change in 
Rule lOP, or assured by officials in the Tax Commission office 
that the change in Rule lOP was designed to address the mos~ 
obvious injustices ·in application of the 400%.Pormula, but would 
not affect the great bulk of valuation decisions. 
In the Fall, 1991, the five counties and their school 
districts were finally advised that a major overhaul of Rule lOP 
had·been under consideration for some time, that the oil i~dustry 
had given its blessing to proposed language, and that the Tax 
commission would shortly begin official consideration of t.~e 
~ -proposed change, hopefully in time to go into effect by January 
1, 1992. Representatives of .the five countie~were told to 
expect reductions of 40% in the Uintah Basin, with lesser 
reductions in Southeastern Uta.~. 
It is worth noting that oil company protests about 
application of the 400% Formu1a are largely confined to Duchesne, 
San Juan and Uintah courities. For whatever reason., Grand and 
Summit counties have been relatively free of 400% Formula 
protests. It is also noteworthy that, in 1990, the five counties 
supported the oil industry's successful bid for a reduction in 
Utah's severance tax. That support was based upon the assumption 
that the 400% Formula would remain in effect for those taxpayers. 
comments 
I. THE 400% FORMULA REASONABLY APPROXIMATES MARKET VALUE IN THE 
MAJORITY OF CASES AND HAS ADVANTAGES FOR THE TAXPAYER AND 
THE TAX COLLECTOR. 
I.A. The 400% Formula is Fair and Predictable. 
There is something inherently unfair about permitting 
taxpayers to elect, from year to year, their preferred assessment 
method. Any taxpayer given such an option, in his own self 
interest, will always select that method of valuation which 
results in the lowest tax. That is clearly what has occurred 
.. 
here. From 1979 to 1985, taxpayers were drilling new wells, oil 
prices were rising and predicted to rise further, enhanced 
recovery methods were implemented, and production increased 
dramatically. Projected cash flow in those heady years would 
- • ..... 
have been enormous. No oil company came forward then and 
advocated a change to discounted cash flow methods. 
Now that production is declining, exploration has 
slowed, and prices have·gone down (and then back up a bit), the 
taxpayers advocate discounted cash flow. It is proper to view 
such petitions with a jaundiced eye. The rules under which the 
game has been played t:..~us far are entitled co deference when 
determining how to play in the future. 
Discounted cash flow, based as it is on projections, 
will always tend to exaggerate the latest trend. With discounted 
cash flow, the kinds of fluctuations that taxpayers and 
government have learned to live with 1n the past, at substantial 
cost, will be exacerbated and even more difficult to handle. 
Predictability in tax rates benefits the taxpayer and government. 
I.B. The 400% Formula Does Not Anpraise All Values. 
An advantage for taxpayers, though a disadvantage to 
government, is that the 400% Formula taxes only producing G;, 
properties and then only on the basis of actual production. The 
producer may be sitting on the largest oil field in the lower 48, 
and know it, but as long as he doesn't produce it, no tax is due. 
~ -
In fact, no tax is due even when it is produced, but not until 
November 30th of the following year. 
~-
7 
The producer who willingly sits on a find is rare. 
However, it frequently happens that two pay zones are discovered, 
but the. second cannot b~ produced until the first· is largely 
exhausted. Sometimes additional rese~es are known but developed 
by drilling additional wells only when the time 1s right. 
Secondary and tertiary recovery must also await the proper 
moment. The 400% Formula does not attempt to tax the known ·.and 
real value of underground deposits not yet in production. 3 
Anot.~er real value of oil and gas properties is the 
value of an undrilled lease.· ~very year oil companies bid 
millions of dollars for the right to gamble on the existence of 
oil unqer federal, state and private lands. The sale prices of 
federal and state leases are reported publicly. The competition 
is frequently fierce, and values are obviously affected by 
dis~ance from ~~own fields or recent discoveries. None of those 
values have been subjected to the property tax, notwithstanding 
the abundance of comparable and actual sales data showing real 
values for those leases. Nothing in the Utah constitution or, 
Utah law prohibits taxing these values. 
3The importance of undeveloped reserves becomes apparent 
w~en one considers the history of the Aneth field, which 
generates almost half of San Juan county• s pro.party value._ 
Application of the discounted cash flow methodology to the Aneth 
field in 1954, the year of its discovery, would undoubtedly have 
predicted field extinction by 1980. Quite th& contrary occurred, 
as oil companies doubled the number of wells, then doubled them 
again in some areas, and in others implemented.tertiary recovery 
methods. These actions, combined with application of new 
tecr~'"loJ.ogies, .has preserved the Aneth field for at least another 
25 years. 
The task force recognizes that the failure of the 400% 
Formula to reach these values does not argue for its accuracy. 
It does, however, argue against the industry c1aims of excessive 
taxation. 
I. c. The 400% Formula Reasonably Anproxi.'111.ates Value. 
The task force has requested that me.'Ilhers of the oil 
and gas industry pressing for modification of Rule 10P back up 
their claims with randomly selected actual sales data showing 
that the method of discounted cash flow they have blessed 
accurately estimates fair market value. No positive response to 
that request has yet arrived. 
8 
The task-force has received information from Pete 
Huddleston. a consultant hired by the industry, that, over the 
course of a well's life, expenses usually equal 35% of revenues. 
No clarification of whether the 35% includes royalty expenses has 
been received. Assuming that it does, and assuming a royalty of 
15%, 4 the assumption implicit in the 400% formula that expenses 
(exclusive of royalties) are 20% of production appears·to be a 
valid assumption. 
.. 
The other assumption implicit in the., 400% Formula is 
4Royalties on oil and gas leases typically run Erom 12.5% to 
20%. 
that value is five times the earnings of the last year. The 
accuracy of that assumption depends on the rate at which 
production declines. At a time .when the federal discount rate is 
at an 18 year low, when stocks are selling at record multiples of 
earnings, a multiple of five seems reasonable indeed. 
I.D. The 400% Form_ula is Based on concrete Data. Free of 
speculation. 
The method which Utah law presumes and prefers for oil 
and gas properties is "capitalization of net revenues." The task 
force believes that the 400% Formula, based as it is upon actual 
revenues, is preferred under the statute to any method that 
involves projections of net revenues. 
Projections of net revenues, discounted and summed, are 
not revenues at all, but nothing more than predictions. The task 
force believes that the statutory language authorizes only use of 
actual net revenues, not projections. Otherwise, the statute 
would say "capitalization of future projected net revenues." 
Accordingly, the method preferred by the statute must involve 
actual revenues. The 400% Formula estimates actual net revenues 
and applies a capitalization multiplier of five. 
If the Tax Commission considers itself obligated to 
discard the assumption that expenses are 20% of gross revenues, 
the task force believes it should consider as the legislative 
r 
preference, direct capitalization of actual net revenues. Under 
this method, the appraiser would apply a multiplier to the actual 
net revenues of each property. If the Tax ·Commission determines 
that "capitalization of net revenues" does authorize discounting 
and summing projections of future net revenues, the task force 
believes that it cannot stop these in its projections. As 
discussed in the following section, once projection of revenues 
is accepted as a valid valuation method, any revenue that can be 
projected must be included. No projection can be discarded 
simply because it reflects onl.y probabilities. 
II. THE DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW METHOD PROPOSED IN RULE l0P 
UNDERVALUES UNDERGROUND OIL AND GAS DEPOSITS 
The task force does not reject in principle the idea of· 
using discounted cash flow to value underground oil and gas 
deposits. As stated in Section I of these comments, the task 
force believes the 400% Formula is not nearly so arbitrary and 
excessive as the oil industry claims. However, the task force 
believes that an appropriate discounted cash tlow method for 
valuing underground oil and gas deposits could be developed. 
Discounted cash flow, unlike the 400% Formula, is not a 
~ 
unitary concept. one cannot say with any precision what value 
discounted cash flow will yield without knowi~g precisely- what 
assumptions will b~ used in the calculation. The task force has 
received scanty information about how the proposed discounted 
~--
cash flow method will affect assessed values. The fiscal note 
attached to the Notice of Proposed Rule/Change states: 
An analysis based on the best.data we have 
available indicates that under the best case 
scenario, which assumes stable oi1 prices, the 
va1ues for oil and gas properties would remain 
virtually the same as last year. 
If this stat~ent is true, what the Property Tax 
Division has told the task force is not true. If this state.~ent 
is true, one wonders why the oil industry is pressing for 
discounted cash flow. The task force cannot adequately consider 
the proposed change to Rule lOP without better information from 
the Property Tax Division, or the tax commission, about the 
actual effect of the proposed change on assessed values in .the 
five counties. 
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Having noted the difficulty of responding to the 
proposal in its present ambiguous state, the task force presents 
the following criticisms of the proposal as presently understood. 
II.A. The Prooosed Rule 10P Unrealistically Assumes ~ ~ 
Constant Oil Prices. 
There is no question that the most difficult problem in 
p~cjecting future revenues from oil wells is to predict future 
. t2._ 
. . -: ·::· _:~ .. : 
oil prices . As the industry' s expert told the task force, st I 
used to try to predict the trend of oil prices. Now I accept 
collect calls from illegal. aliens." 
The task force believes that the unpredictability of 
oil prices is the best argument for avoiding discounted cash 
flow. If, however, one undertakes to tread in this dangerous 
area, one ought at least to adopt the forecasts of the oil 
industry itself. The newspapers are full of oil company 
predictions of future oil price shocks. At the very least, the 
tax commission shoul.d use t;he survey forecasts of the Society of 
Petroleum Evaluation Engineer, which currently predicts oil price 
escalation of 4.5 to 5.5% annually. Those figures are readily 
available and the best evidence of industry expectation. The 
task force understands that those figures are used in oil 
industry ecoriomic·analyses. 
II.B. The Proposed Rule ·10? Does Not Adeauatelv F ➔ x a 
Discount Rate. 
The task force is unable to predict with any accuracy 
what discount rate will be used in the proposed Rule lOP. The 
task force recognizes that the discount rate must change as 
~arket conditions c~angep and that the greater risk associated 
with oil and gas assets justifies a higher rat~. 
The lending industry currently indexes adjustable rate 
1G 
home mortgages to the weekly average of treasury, securities 
adjusted to a constant maturity of one year. The comm.on index is 
2.5% above this rate. Allowing that oil and gas properties are 
more risky than home mortgages, 5 the. task force would accept an 
index 4.0% above the weekJ.y treasury securities rate. 
II.C. The Proposed Rule lOP Ianor~s Undeveloped Values.· 
Perhaps the most comprehensive criticism of proposed 
Rule lOP is that, having undertaken to project cash flows from 
oil and gas properties, it then ignores important components of 
those flows. The resultant undervaluation could be compared to 
assessing a subdivision based only upon the homes actually 
constructed. The vacant lots,. not yet developed, have obvious 
value that is not ignored by county assessors. The tax 
commission should do no less in performing its statU.tory duties~ 
Here are a few examples of escaped value: 
1. undrilled leases. Until recently, the Bureau of 
Land Management routinely performed a discounted cash flow 
analysis on properties proposed for oil and gas leases. The 
analysis incorporated the probabilities of different outcomes, 
projected cash flows from discoveries, and assigned values to the 
leases. Bids below that appraised price were~not accepted. 
5nepending on the location of the home. 
The BLM has discontinued this practice for federal 
leases, choosing to rely on the competitive bidding process to 
establish those values. However, for Indian leases, the BLM 
st~ll uses discounted cash flow to appraised lease values. 
Whether the tax.commission chooses to rely on 
competitively bid prices to establish lease values, or the BLM 
\ 
appraisal method, it cannot ignore the very real value of 
uncrilled leases. Once the tax commission undertakes to predict 
the future, it cannot ignore the value of future production from 
undrilled leases. 
2. -~roduction ·from Future Drillina. When a company 
successfully encounters oil or gas in paying quantities, it 
almost always plans a second well, and so on. The success rate 
of such wells, known as development wells, is extremely high. No 
rational oil company would sell such a property after the first 
well comes in without considering the production likely from 
subsequent wells. 
A discounted cash flow method based upon projected 
production from the first well alone ignores very real and very 
~ -
predictable values. If the tax commission is to use discounted 
cash flow, it must include cash flow from predictable future 
-~ 
drilling. 6 
This is not an insubstantial consideration. In the 
Aneth field, for example, wells were originally drilled on 80 
acre spacing. Since that time, additional wells have been 
drilled throughout the field on 40 acre spacing. In the Aneth 
Unit, some 20 acre wells have been drilled. The reasons for this 
additional drilling are complex, but the values uncovered were 
real and predictable long before the wells were actually drilled. 
3. ·Production frc~ E..~ha.~ced Recoverv-. All of the 
possibilities for enhanced recover~ cannot be described here. It 
is enough to point out that application of enhanced recovery 
methods can be predicted with reasonable certainty. No rational 
oil co~pany would ignore those possibilities when selling a 
property. The tax commission should not do so either. 
If the Property Tax Division is to capture all of these 
"escaped values st , it must have more ammunition than proposed Rule 
10P provides. The obvious truth about these values is that the 
oil companies themselves have the best information about these 
values. If the Property Tax Division cannot get that 
information, that deficiency argues against adopting proposed 
Rule lOP. 
6Less, of course, the cost of drilling the well. 
II.D. Proposed Rule lOP Makes No Provision for a 
Transition. 
All of the oil producers have been paying taxes based 
upon the 400% Formula for more than a decade. As discussed 
earlier, the 400% Formula has the significant benefit of delaying 
all tax payments one year. In the change from the 400% Formula 
to proposed Rule lOP, which is a change from looking backward to 
looking forward, the present escapes taxation. 
One example would suffice. suppose that Oil Company A 
began production from the Bonanza Well on January 1, 1991. No 
1991 taxes will be ass:essed on that well because there was no 
1990 production and the 400%·Form.ula governs 1991. Assume that 
proposed Ru1e·10P goes into effect on Janua::y 1, 1992, and that 
production from the Bonanza Well rapidly declines and ends on 
December 31, 1991. The production from that well will never 
suffer a property tax. 
This is an extreme example, but the principle lit 
illustrates is true for every well. Without a transition rule, 
one year of production from every well will totally escape 
taxation. If proposed Rule lOP, or indeed any discounted cash 
.. 
flow method, is adopted, it must include a transition rule to 
make sure that value is taxed. ., 
II:E. Pronosed Rule lOP Does Not Value Product➔ on Before 
The Lien Date. 
Related to the transitiona1 problem described in 
Section II.D. above is the problem of the interaction of any 
discounted cash flow method with the lien date. Properties are 
valued as· of January 1, of each year. Proper~ies or values that 
do not come into existence until January 2 escape taxation. For 
most properties, that is not a problem, since the value of the 
property tends to remain constant. There is no significant 
depreciation in value from the date the property comes into 
existence until the following January 1. 
For oil and gas pr~perties, however, individual wells 
usuaJ.ly have their highest value ~diately after successful 
completion. Under proposed Rule l0P, production from that date 
unt~l the following January 1 will never figure into the 
discounted cash flow v~lue. For many wells, that loss 
constitutes a substantial portion of the lifetime value of the 
well. 
The task force sees no constitutional or statutory 
impediment to including in the first years value. The cash flow 
that preceded the January 1 lien date. If there is such an 
impediment, adoption of proposed Rule lOP should be delaye~ until 
.. 
the impediment is removed. 
., 
III. DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW SHOULD BE USED ONLY IF TASK FORCE 
,...., 
. 
: . 1-8 
CONCERNS ARE APPRESSED 
The task force has no philosophical objection to using 
discounted cash flow to value oil and gas properties. As 
discussed above, the task force believes that the 400% Fonn.ula, 
in the long run and in consideration of all re1evant_ factors, is 
the preferred method. The task force has also described the 
deficiencies of Proposed Rule l0P. However, if the Tax 
Commission determines that discounted cash flow must be utilized, 
the task force·would find acceptable a rule that includes the 
following elements: 
A. Escalation of oil prices in accordance with 
society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineer survey 
forecasts. 
B. Valuation of undrilled leases and undeveloped 
reserves. 
c. Use of a discount rate of 4.0% above the 
treasury securities rate. 
D. A tra.~sition rule that requires~inclusion of 
the income of the priori year in the first year's 
value. 
E .. Inclusion of pre January 1 net revenues in 
·..:O 
the first year's value. 
Assuming all of these provisions were included in 
proposed Rule lOP, the task-force would find the use of 
discounted cash flow acceptable, subj·ect of cours~ to protests 
about its· actual application. The task force reiterates, 
however, its position that the 400% Formula is preferable because 
of its ease of administration and because it is more predic~able 
and fair. The task force would propose that the Tax Commission 
offer each taxpayer the option of electing either method. Once 
-elected for a particular well, the election could be changed only 
with the approval of the affected county. 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
James Harvey Jordan, Trustee of the James H. 
Jordan Revocable Trust dated June I, 2007, 
Martha Jordan Boright, Mary Edna Jordan, 
Michael C. Kelley, and Jary Anne Kelley, 
Trustee of the Kelley Joint Trust dated 
January 7, 2013, Gary E. Kelley, Nonna 
Stroud Dickey, Mara Beth Harner, Jan 
Rhodes as Trustee of the Revocable Rhodes 
Family Living Trust dated April 19, 2005, 
Wendy Sue Pack, Craig McSorley, Deborah J. 
Bowers, Laura Ward, Mark McSorely, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim 
Defendants, 
. .r 
Eddie R. Jensen and Ly-Thi Jensen, 
Defendants/Counterclaim 
Plaintiffs. 
Eddie R. Jensen and Ly-Thi Jensen, 
Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
Axia Energy, LLC, Stonegate Resources, 
LCC, Wasatch Oil & Gas, LLC, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 130800084 
Judge SAMUEL P. CHIARA 
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs/Counterclaim Defendants' Motion for 
( ( 
Summary Judgment; the Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs/Third-Party Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Swnmary Judgment; and the Third-Party Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Court heard oral argument on the Motions on September 24, 2014. The Court has 
thoroughly reviewed the arguments of counsel, the Motions, the supplemental pleadings, and the 
relevant case law and statutes. This Ruling and Order will resolve all three of the pending 
Motions for Summary Judgment. 
Initially, the Court recognizes the passage of time in issuing this Ruling and Order. 
Unfortunately, the necessary recusal of Judge Peterson, followed much later by the recusal of 
Judge McClellan, as well as the difficulty of the issues, resulted in a longer delay than is typical. 
The Court thanks the parties and counsel for their patience. The Court would also like to 
recognize the exceptional quality of each party's arguments and written briefs. The level of 
professionalism all sides displayed was outstanding. The quality of the legal work is very high. 
The argwnents are well reasoned and thorough, which made the decision difficult, but also left 
the Court confident the parties have accurately presented the full scope of the law dealing with 
these issues. 
Undi§puted Material Facts 
1. The property that is the subject of this case consists of approximately 40 acres in 
Randlett, Utah, legally described as the Northeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of 
Section 32, Township 7 South, Range 20 East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
2. On October 25, 1954, Olivia Jordan, Marie Robertson, and Caroline Kelley (the 
"Jordans'') acquired the property. 
3. The Jordans sold the property to Jonathan Anthony Andrews, reserving the oil, gas, and 
2 
'\ ( ·., 
., 
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mineral rights. The deed is dated February 3, 1995, and recorded March 15, 199S, at 
Book 592, Page 95, in the Uintah County Recorder's Office. 
4. The real property tax notice for the 199 5 taxes on the property was mailed by Uintah 
County to Olivia Jordan c/o Jonathan Anthony Andrews, P.O. Box 5451, Gainsville. Fl. 
32602. 
S. The 1995 taxes were not timely paid. 
6. The 1996 tax notice was sent to Jonathan Anthony Andrews, at P.O. Box 851981, 
Richardson, Texas. Those ta>ees in the amount of $32.42 were paid on November 21, 
1996. 
7. 
8 . 
The 1997 tax notice was sent to Jonathan Anthony Andrews at the Richardson, Texas 
address. The 1997 taxes in the amount of $35.92 were paid on December 10, 1997. 
On November 17, 1997, $33.05 was paid on the 1995 taxes. After payment on penalties 
and interest, there was a balance owing of $8.94. 
9. The 1998 and 1999 tax notices were sent to Johnathan Anthony Andrews at the 
~ Richardson, Texas P .0. Box. The taxes for 1998 and 1999 were not paid. 
10. For failing to pay the real property taxes assessed for the 1995, 1998, and 1999 tax years, 
resulting in a past due amount of$167.19, Uintah County seized and sold the property on 
May 2S, 2000. 
11. The record of delinquent taxes prepared by the treasurer and recorded states that the date 
of the tax lien is January 16, 19961, and date of delinquency is January 16, 1996. 
1 All parties agree this date is incorrect, and likely due to a typographical error. The taxes 
for the 1996 year were paid. The record should have indicated a tax lien date and delinquency 
date of January 1, 1995, as there remained a balance due on the 1995 taxes. 
3 
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12. The assessment and levy for the 1995 tax year did not occur until on or after May 12, 
199S. 
13. No notice was ever given to the Jordans of the assessment of 1995, the failure to pay the 
taxes, or the tax sale. 
14. On May 25, 20001 Uintah County executed a tax deed concerning the property. The 
grantee was Quality Remediation Services ("QRS"), who paid the County $6,000.00. 
15. On December 13, 2000, QRS executed a warranty deed concerning the property. The 
Jensens were the grantees, and paid $5,500.00 to QRS. 
16. In a January 2001 Real Property Transfer Survey Standard Land Questionnaire the 
Jensens indicated they paid fair market value for the property, and that the sale did not 
include the mineral rights. 
17. Prior to March 2013, the Jensens never asserted a claim to own thc'mineral rights in the 
property. 
18. Since 1995, the Jordans have periodically leased the oil, gas, and mineral rights. 
19. In May 2011, Stonegate entered into oil and gas leases with the successors in interest to 
the Jordans. In August of 2011, Stonegate assigned the working interest in these leases to 
Axia, reserving for itself and Wasatch a royalty interest. 
20. In November 2011, the Jensens entered into a Surface Use Agreement and Grant of 
Easements, allowing Axia to conduct exploration and drilling operations on the property. 
21. Over time, Axia has paid the Jensens $21,182 under the Swface Use Agreement. 
22. Axia paid all the taxes associated with the mineral rights in 2012 and 2013, totaling 
$84,878.32. 
4 
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Analysis 
Swnmary judgment is appropriate onJy when no genuine issue of material fact exists and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. 
Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789, 791 (Utah App. 1991); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The facts Blld 
evidence are viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. America Mut Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950,957 (Utah App. 1989). 
The Motions concern competing claims to title of the oil, gas, and mineral estate. There 
is no dispute of material fact. Therefore, the issue can be determined as a matter of law. 
I. Whether 1,Jintah County's 199S general assessment included taxing the mineral interest? 
The first issue is whether the Jordans' oil, gas, and mineral rights were severed from the 
surface estate and not assessed or levied on by Uintah County in 1995. 
The Jordans1 argue that the mineral estate was reserved at the time of conveyance of the 
surface rights to Mr. Andrews on February 3, 199S. The Uintah County Assessor assessed the 
property on May 22, 1995. Consequently, the Jordans argue that the County Assessor did not 
assess the mineral rights because the mineral estate had been severed by that time. Because the 
County Assessor did not assess the mineral rights, the Jordans argue there was no levy. 
The Jensens argue that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103 the 1995 tax assessment 
occurred on January 11 1995, before the February 3, 1995, severance. The Jensens argue that the 
2 The Jordans and Axia argue for the same result, and largely offer the same arguments 
and cite to the same case law in their separate Motions and separate replies. For clarity and 
brevity, the Court will refer to the Jordans when discussing both the Jordans' and Axia's 
arguments and positions. 
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lien for the 199S unpaid taxes attached as of January 1, 1995. As a consequence, the Jensens 
argue that the mineral rights were levied and properly passed by tax deed at the 2000 tax sale. 
"Tax sale proceedings are predicated and founded upon failure to pay a tax assessed 
against the property, and, therefore, no validity can attach to any sale except of the property 
assessed and delinquent for failure to pay the tax levied on the assessment as made.,, Tintle 
Undlne Mining Co. v. Ercanbrack, 14 P .2d 1184, 1189 (Utah 193 8). "If property rights which 
are not included in an assessment are sold or extinguishable by a tax sale, there would be a taking 
of property without due process of law." Hayes v. Gibbs, 169 P .2d 781, 786 (Utah 1946). If 
l,Jintah County did not assess the mineral estate, the mineral estate was not subject to the tax lien 
and could not pass at a tax sale. Therefore, the date of assessment, and whether Uintah County 
had the power to assess the mineral estate, are critical. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-103(a)·~tates: "All tangible taxable property , .• shall be assessed 
and taxed at a uni.form rate on the basis ofits fair market value, as valued on January I, unless 
otherwise provided by law." Also, "(a] tax upon real property is a lien against the property 
assessed ... [and] shall attach on January 1 of each year." Utah Code Ann.§ 59-2-1325. 
Notwithstanding, the issue of when the date of assessment and levy occurs has been 
authoritatively decided in Utah. In Huntington City v. Peterson, S18 P.2d 1246 (Utah 1974), 
Huntington City bought a parcel of land on April 7, 19S9. The Emery County assessor assessed 
the parcel of land, and the levy for tax was made in August 1959. No notice of the tax 
assessment was given to Huntington City, The party assessed the 1959 taxes did not pay the 
taxes and the property was sold at a tax sale. The Utah Supreme Court quieted title to 
Huntington City, holding that the assessment occurred after Huntington City acquired the 
6 
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property and that no tax lien attached as a consequence. 
In Gillmor v. Dale, 15 P .932 (Utah 1904), the Utah Supreme Court held that a property 
tax .. does not become a lien on real estate until the rate thereof is fixed, and the tax levied ..• " 
because "[t]he city council was not authorized, .. to levy a taxJ except on property within its 
corporate limits, and any levy upon property not within such limits is without authority and 
void." Id. at 934. 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court in the case of West Valley City Corp. v. Sall Lake 
City, 852 P.2d 1000, 1003 (Utah 1993), found: 
The date of assessment and levy I not the statutory lien date of January 1st. is the 
relevant date for determining whether property is within the reach of a taxing entity's 
power for the purpose of assessing, levying and collecting taxes on the property. 
See also H.C. Massey v. Grifflths. 153 P.3d 312,110 (Utah 2007)("Assessment is the basis of the 
tax title and only that interest which was properly assessed can be sold.") ., 
The Jensens contend that Utah Code Ann.§§ 59-2-1325 and 59-2-103 dictate the lien 
date as January 1, of the year the property was assessed. The Jensens also attempt to distinguish 
the above line of cases by arguing that those cases merely apply to property transferred to a tax 
exempt entity. The Jensens argue the reason for treating a tax exempt entity differently is a tax 
exempt entity would have no reason to believe that they would be tmced. Therefore, selling a tax 
exempt entity's property for failure to pay truces would be improper. 
The Jensens' argument that a tax lien attaches on January 1, regardless of the date of 
assessment end levy, is not without support. The dissenting opinion in Huntington, 518 P .2d at 
1249-50 (Henriod, J., dissenting), also insisted that a tax lien attaches on January 1 pursuant to 
statute. While the dissenting opinion is well reasoned, the majority rejected it This Court is 
7 
required to follow binding precedent, which is the majority opinion. 
Further, if the above line of cases only apply to tax exempt entities, that qualification was 
not stated explicitly in the holdings, and the reasoning to treat tax exempt entities differently in 
these scenarios was not explained. If the reason is, as the Jensens suggest, that tax exempt 
entities would have no reason to suspect tax liability, the same reasoning would apply to the facts 
here. The Jordans also had no reason to suspect a tax liability to the County because: (1) their 
mineral interest was severed prior to taxation; (2) the mineral interest was non-productive; (3) 
counties are not empowered to tax a severed mineral interest under the Constitution and the Act; 
(4) Uintah Cowtty did not believe that they assessed these mineral interests in 1995; (5) the 
Jordans had never had their mineral estate assessed separately prior to 1995;and (6) the Uintah 
Cowity Record of Delinquent Taxes showed the wrong lien date for the property. Based on these 
factors, the Jordans would have had no reason to believe that their mineral interest was truced by 
Uintah County for the 1995 year. 
Because the property was not assessed by the Uintah County assessor until after the 
February 3, 199S, severance date, the mineral estate was not assessed by the Cowity. Uintah 
County only assessed the surface rights. The tax lien did not attach to the mineral rights. 
Consequently, authority and jurisdiction to sell the mineral rights were not acquired by the 
County, and the mineral interests were not sold at the May 2000 tax sale, 
II, Whether Uintah County had the authorin, to assess the severed mineral interest? 
The Jordans argue Uintah County does not have the authority to separately assess, levy, 
and seize mineral rights. The Jordans point to Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-201 and S9-5-102, et 
8 
seq., which directs that counties tax the surface interest, and the l)tah State Tax Commission 
taxes the mineral interest. The Jordans also cite to case law which hold the same. See Telonis v. 
Staley, 144 P.2d 513, 515 {Utah 1943)("Where there is separate ownership of the respective 
rights [referring to severed surface and mineral rights], separate levy and separate sale would 
necesseriJy follow .... "); Kanawha & Hocking Coal & Coke Co. v. Carbon County, 535 P.2d 
1139, 1140 (Utah 1975)(holding Utah State Tax CQmmission taxes mineral rights and counties 
tax surface rights). 
The Jensens argue Uintah County was required to tax the mineral interests as part of the 
general assessment. The Jensens argue that "all tangible property in the State that is not exempt . 
. . shall be" assessed and taxed. Utah Constitution, Article Xlll, Section 2. Pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann.§ 59 .. 2-301, counties are required to assess all property not assessed by the Utah State 
Tax Commission. The Jensens argue the Commissfon is'obligated to assess only valuable 
mineral deposits. The Jensens argue that the mineral estate was not valuable until 2012 when the 
mine started producing. Therefore, the Jensens argue Uintah Cowtty was required to assess the 
mineral estate in 1995 when it was not valuable, or at least, had not had a value applied to it 
Admittedly, this is a difficult issue. On one hand, if it is true that the Commission is only 
required to tax producing or valuable mineral interests, and counties are only authorized to tax 
surface rights, then there is seemingly a gap left that allows unproductive mineral interests to go 
witaxed. Although those unproductive mineral interests are not producing, in many instances 
they perhaps have some undetennined value. On the other hand, if cowtties are required to tax 
non-producing mineral interests, the practical problem of determining the value of an 
unproductive mineral interest arises. Additionally, Uintah County does not attempt to determine 
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a value or apply a tax rate to severed mineral interests. Neither does Uintah County send 
separate tax bills, notices, or notices of sales to owners of severed mineral interests. Following 
Jensen's reasoning, severed unproductive mineral interests have unknowingly passed at 
nu_merous tax sales. Because Uintah County does not notify owners of severed mineral interests 
of assessments or tax sales, it is likely that many owners of severed mineral interests find 
themselves in an identical position to the Jordans. Finally, where surface and mineral interests 
have been severed, such as is likely the case with hundreds or even thousands of parcels in 
Umtah County, the county>s general assessment results in only one tax bill even though there are 
at least two owners. That tax bill is uniformly assessed to and paid by the surface owner. Would 
mineral interest owners be liable to pay some portion of the tax where the mineral interest is 
nonproductive and not otherwise taxed? How would the property owners divide the bill? What 
would happen if one party paid the full amount of the bill? 
The Court determines that undeveloped or undiscovered minerals underlying a piece of 
property are akin to an intangible asset As an intangible asset, the undiscovered minerals fall 
outside the scope of Article XIII, Section 2, of the Utah Constitution, and are not subject to 
taxation. It follows that counties are not responsible for determining the value of undeveloped or 
undiscovered minerals and are not authorized or required to tax valueless property. The Jensens 
provide no support for their argument that counties are responsible for taxing valueless property, 
and the Court is not aware of any. Valueless property cannot be taxed. Applying a tax rate to 
property that bas either no market value or an undetermined market value is pointless because the 
resulting tax obligation would be zero. Valuable mineral interests whose fair market value can 
be determined are required by statute and the Utah Constitution to be assessed by the Utah State 
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Tax Commission. Therefore, Uintah County did not have the authority to assess the severed 
mineral estate in 1995, as the mineral estate at that time was not producing, the minerals were 
undiscovered, and the value of the mineral estate was unknown. 
ijI. Whether the §tatute of limitations bars any challenge to the May 2000 tax deed, despite no 
notice given to the Jor4ans? 
If the mineral estate was properly assessed by Uintah County, and a tax lien attached, the 
next question is whether the Jordans' constitutional challenge based on lack of notice is barred by 
the statute of limitations for tax deeds. 
The Jensens argue that any challenge to their purchase of the mineral estate at the May 
2000 tax sale is barred by the four-year statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-206 bars 
any challenges to tax title after four years from the date of the sale. Section 206 states: 
. ., 
an action or defense to recover, take possession of, quiet title to, or detennine the 
ownership of real property may not be commenced against the holder of a tax title 
after the expiration of four years from the date of the sale, conveyance, or transfer of 
the tax title to any county, or directly to any other purchaser at any public or private 
sale. This section may not bar any action or defense by the owner of the legal title 
to the property which he or his predecessor actually occupied or possessed within 
four years from the commencement of an action or defense .... 
The Jensens have held the May 2000 tax title beyond the four--year period set forth in Section 
206. There is no argument that the Jordans did not actually possess the mineral estate at any time 
during the four-year time period between May 2000, and May 2004.3 
3The Court notes here the inequality the statute would create for owners of legal title to 
unproductive mineral estates, as they would never be able to show actual possession of an 
unproductive mineral estate. While it's not necessary to the outcome here, the Court finds that 
the Jordans exercised as much actual possession or control of the mineral estate as possible, by 
periodically leasing the minerals over the many years following the tax sale. 
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The parties have offered extensive case law on this issue from a variety of jurisdictions. 
The Court has reviewed the cases cited in the Motions and supplemental pleadings and found 
them useful for gaining a general understanding of the law on this issue. Reliance on only two of 
the cases is necessary and sufficient for this decision. In Jones v. Flowers, 541 U.S. 220 (2006), 
the U.S. Supreme Court found that selling a person's property at a tax sale without notice was a 
violation of the person's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The Court detennined that 
notice of the tax sale must be reasonably calculated to reach the intended person to be deemed 
constitutionally sufficient. Id. at 226; see also Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The Utah Supreme Cowt has addressed the issue ofapplication of the 
tax title statute of limitations where the tax sale included a procedural error. Frederiksen v. 
LaFleur, 632 P.2d 827 (Utah 1981). In Frederiksen, the Court upheld the application of the 
statute of limitations baning a challenge based on a procedural defect in the tax sale (the cowity · 
auditor's appointment was not made in writing, and had failed to take an oath of office, as 
required by statute). The Court reasoned that the purpose of the statute of limitations was to 
provide certainness and finality to tax sales, even if the sale was invalid because of procedural 
defects in the execution. Importantly for our pwposes, however, is footnote 14 of the 
Frederiksen opinion, in which Justice Oaks stated in dicta, "We expressly reserve opinion on 
whether the special statute of limitations could protect a tax title acquired by means repugnant to 
fundamental fairness or whether such an application of the statute would exceed the limits of 
statutory intent or constitutional pennissibility." Id. at 831, fn. 14. 
Here, the Jordans were not given notice of the 1995 assessment or any assessment 
thereafter. The Jordans were not listed on the assessment roll. Mr. Andrews was the only one 
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given notice of the taxes levied after the severance. The general assessments made on the 
Jordans' property prior to the 199S severance never explicitly included an assessment for the 
mineral estate. Neither the Jordans, nor their predecessors, were ever given notice of the May 
2000 tax sale. Uintah County had the addresses for the Jordans and their attorney. The County 
had previously sent tax notices for years prior to 1995 to Olivia Jordan. 
The Court finds that this is one particular instance that Justice Oaks alluded to where the 
special statute of limitations does not apply. One of the most critical and fundamental due 
process rights is the right to notice, particularly when notice pertains to a government seizure of 
property. A statute of limitations that eliminates a person's right to challenge a tax sale, even 
when notice was not given, runs afoul of Constitutional protections. The facts here are not 
similar to those in Frediksen, where the error in the tax sale involved a minor procedural issue. 
The error here was substantive and significant. Consequently the tax deed was not merely 
voidable and subject to the statute of limitations, as the Jensens suggest. The tax deed is void 
because the lack of notice to the Jordans is ajwisdictional defect of the sale. Without 
jurisdiction, the statute of limitations did not start, let alone expire. Selling the Jordans' mineral 
interest at a tax sale without notice was an unconstitutional taking and a violation of due process. 
The Court finds that selling property at a county tax sale without any notice to the legal owner of 
the property is repugnant to fundamental fairness. 
Further, record notice does not absolved the County of the problem. First. record notice 
does not satisfy the requirements outlined in Jones v. Flowers. Second, the record notice showed 
that the tax lien date was January I 6, I 996J which all parties agree was a clerical error, but 
nonetheless would not have given the Jordans accurate notice that their mineral interest may be 
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in jeopardy of being sold. The County also admits that the Uintah County Assessor did not 
assess the mineral rights in this case and did not believe he was required to do so. Therefore, 
even if the Jordans had reviewed the record and inquired of the County concerning a potential 
sale of their interest, the County would have affinned that their property was not subject to the 
tax sale. Finally, an actual inspection of the land during the time of the tax sale or four years 
after would not have given the Jordans any indication that their mineral interest had been sold at 
a tax sale. There was no development on the overlying surface property, nor was there any 
physical evidence of production of the mineral interest 
Because there was no actual notice of the tax sale, record notice was insufficient and 
inaccurate, and because there was no physical evidence to suggest to the Jordans that the property 
might have been sold, the Court finds that the sale was repugnant to fundamental fairness. The 
sale, if intended to convey the severed mineral interests, waswitht>ut due process of law, and 
resulted in an unconstitutional talcing, Consequently, pursuant to Frederiksen footnote 14, the 
statute of limitations does not apply to bar the Jordans' challenge to the tax sale. 
IV. Whether the heirs of Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley have standing to assert the due 
proces§ claims? 
Finally, the Jensens argue that the heirs of Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley lack 
standing to assert the due process rights. Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley passed away in 
2003 and 2002, respectively. Ms. Robertson's and Ms. Kelley's heirs are some of the Plaintiffs 
claiming and interest in the property. 
"[I]n Utah, as in the federal system, standing is a jurisdictional requirement." Brown v. 
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J)iv. of Water Rights of Dep't of Natural Res., 2010 UT 14,112,228 P.3d 747. "As a general 
rule, courts do not permit a party to assert the constitutional rights of a third party." Shelledy v. 
Lore, 836 P.2d 786, 789 (Utah 1992). "[A] litigant must assert his own legal rights and interests, 
and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties." Id. 
However, "it has long been recognized that the surviving claims of a decedent must be 
pursued by a third party." Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,711 (1987). "[P]ennitting appellees to 
raise their decedent• s claims is merely an extension of the common law's provision for 
appointment of a decedent's representative. It is therefore a 'settled practice of the courts' not 
open to objection on the ground that it pennits a litigant to raise third parties' rights." Id. at 712. 
There are "two factors to be considered in detennining when the third-party rule should 
be suspended: the relationship of the litigant to the person whose right he seeks to assert, and the 
ability oftbe third party to assert his own right. 0 Irving v. Clark, 758 F.2d 1260, 118 (81h Cir. 
198S). In Lewis v. Grinker, 111 F. Supp 2d 142, 168 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), the court explained: 
[m]oreover, as other courts have observed, the relationship between a parent and 
child is much closer than those involved in other cases in which third-party standing 
has been found to exist . . . [t]he relationship between parent and child has been 
deemed to be "more than sufficient to address the concerns that underlie the 
prudential doctrine" of third-party standing. Elias v. United States Dep 't of State, 
721 F. Supp. 243, 246-47 (N.D.Cal. 1989). Other courts have permitted a child to 
assert his or her parent's equal protection rights in challenging the validity of statutes 
that conferred United States citizenship on the foreign-born offspring of United 
States citizen fathers, but not United States citizen mothers, see Wauchope v. United 
States Dep 'to/State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1411 (9th Cir. 1993); Elisa, 721 F. Supp. at 246-
4 7, or which chilled the parent's right to adopt a child, see Lindley ex rel. Lindley v. 
Sullivan, 889 F .2d 124, 129 {7th Cir. 1989) ... Further, the effectiveness of a parent's 
representation of his or her child is reflected in the well-established tradition that 
pennits parents to sue as the representatives of their minor children and to "maintain 
litigation that rests directly on the standing of the children themselves." 13 Wright 
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3531.9 (2d ed. 1984); see 
also, e.g., Sherman v. Community Consol. Sch. Dist. 21,980 F.2d 437,441 {7'b Cir. 
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1992). 
Here, Marie Robertson and Caroline Kelley are deceased and cannot pursue their constitutional 
claims. As set forth above, they did not receive notice, and were not aware of their potential 
constitutional claims before they died. Because they did not receive notice, they were not able to 
pursue their constitutional claims before their deaths. The Plaintiffs, as heirs of Marie Robertson 
and Caroline Kelley, also did not receive notice of the assessment, taxes, or sale. 
As in Wauchope v. U.S. Dept. O/State, 756 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Cal. 1991)1 it is 
''undisputed Plaintiffs' interests are harmonious with and at least as strong as the interest that 
(their) mother would have asserted." The Plaintiffs, as children of Marie Robertson and Caroline 
Kelley, have a sufficiently close relationship to satisfy the relationship factor in the third-party 
standing test. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs have third-party standing to assert the 
constitutional claims. ., 
V. Whether Portions of Rolene Rasmussen's Affidavit should be Strjcken? 
In a separate motion, but in conjunction with its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
Jensens moved the court to strike certain portions of Rolene Rasmussen's testimony contained in 
an affidavit. Jensens argue that the offending portions of the affidavit are legal conclusions not 
based upon personal knowledge, rather than statements of fact. The particu)ar paragraphs 
complained of read as follows: 
6. The Uintah CoWlty Assessor,s office does not assess mineral rights. Mineral rights are 
handled by the Utah State Tax Commission. 
7. The mineral rights on the Property would not have been included in and would not 
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have been part of the Uintah County assessment of the Property in 199S or any years thereafter. 
9. Mineral rights are not included in any appraisal of real property by the Uintah County 
Appraiser's office since the mineral rights are not assessed by the cowity. 
The Court finds that the statements can be read either as statements of fact or as legal 
conclusions. The statement that the Uintah County Assessor's office does not assess mineral 
rights can be taken as a statement of fact if Rasmussen has knowledge that the office makes no 
attempt to value or assess mineral rights. Further, if Rasmussen knows that the office doesn't 
separately assess mineral rights that have been severed from surface rights, such is a statement of 
fact. Finally, if Rasmussen knows that appraisers in Uintah County don't attempt to value 
minerals when perfonning appraisals for assessment purposes, such is a statement of fact. The 
Court accepts Rasmussen's statement to establish these facts. 
To the extent that Rasmussen's statement attempts to reach the ultimate legal conclusions 
in this case, the Court disregards Rasmussen's statement for that purpose. 
Order 
The Jordans' and Axia's Motions for Summary Judgment are granted. The Jensen's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The Court quiets title to the mineral interest in the 
Jordans. Pursuant to Code v. Utah Dept. of Health, 162 P .3d 1097 (Utah 2007), and Utah R. Civ. 
P. 7(f){2), the parties are notified that this is the final ruling and order in this case. The parties 
need not prepare or submit any other order. 
Dated this fl day of __ [-:_~-------· 2015. 
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